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INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, securities fraud class action settlements produced $5.45 billion in 
cash to be distributed to defrauded investors.1 Institutional investors own the 
lion’s share of the publicly traded equity securities in this country and therefore 
were entitled to collect most of that money by simply filing relatively simple 
claims forms documenting their trading during the class period. Those 
institutions that chose to do so recouped large sums of money for their 
beneficiaries.2 
However, in a pilot study we published two years ago, we reported that 
nearly two-thirds of the institutional investors with financial losses in fifty-
three settled securities class actions failed to submit claims. As a consequence 
of this failure, substantial sums that they were entitled to receive were given to 
others.3 Using some back-of-the-envelope calculations, one commentator 
analyzing our results suggested that each year slightly more than $1 billion is 
left on the settlement table by nonfiling financial institutions.4 Because we had 
a small sample of settlements in our study, we could only reach tentative 
conclusions about the extent of the problem. The pilot study nonetheless 
portended several disturbing policy implications for securities class actions. 
This Article presents the results of a much more extensive investigation of 
the frequency with which financial institutions submit claims in settled 
securities class actions. We combine both an empirical study of a large set of 
settlements and the results of a survey of institutional investors about their 
claims filing practices. Our sample for the first part of the analysis contains 118 
 
1. Inst’l Shareholder Servs., Final Settlements for 2004, http://scas. issproxy.com/  
(last visited Nov. 11, 2005); see also Barry B. Burr, More Money: $5.5 Billion Up for Taking 
from Securities Litigation, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Oct. 18, 2004, at 4; Mark Jaffe, 
Investors Often Don’t File Claims: Shareholder’s Lawsuits Generate Settlements for 
Everyone, PHILA. INQ., Dec. 27, 2003, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/ 
business/7577675.htm. 
2. For instance, the State of Wisconsin Investment Board has recovered an average of 
$7 million annually over the past several years because it pursued such claims. Jaffe, supra 
note 1. 
3. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do 
Institutional Investors Fail To File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 
855 (2002). 
4. See A.C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 883 (2002). 
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settlements that were not included in our earlier study.5 The number of 
settlements examined in this study is, therefore, more than twice as many as we 
earlier examined. We find that less than thirty percent of institutional investors 
with provable losses perfect their claims in these settlements.6 
We then explore the possible explanations for this widespread failure. We 
suggest a wide range of potential problems, from mechanical failures in the 
notification and recordkeeping processes to more subtle issues such as portfolio 
managers’ beliefs that only investment activities produce significant returns for 
their clients. 
In order to determine which of these problems were the main culprits, we 
surveyed institutional investors about their claims filing practices, asking them 
who was responsible for this task, how they performed it, and what, if any, 
performance monitoring was done. We learned that most institutions relied on 
their custodian banks to file claims for them in securities fraud class action 
settlements, that many of these institutions did little monitoring of whether the 
custodian actually performed these services, and that custodians had financial 
disincentives to file claims on behalf of their clients. Nevertheless, virtually 
every respondent reported that their institution filed claims in all settlements in 
which it was a class member. Our respondents also identified a number of 
problems with the claims filing process, including difficulties in learning about 
settlements, monitoring claims, gathering and compiling information necessary 
to complete claims, and accounting for payments made after they are received. 
Accepting for the moment our empirical findings that many institutions 
have failed to file claims, should their trustees be liable for this failure? What 
about their custodian banks that agreed to make these claims for the 
institutions? If so, what is the appropriate standard of liability that we should 
apply in this situation? We argue that any such failures should be evaluated as 
potential breaches of the duty of care consistent with the now invigorated 
monitoring obligations embraced in Delaware’s Caremark decision.7 Applying 
this standard to our problem, we believe that the trustees of institutional 
investors must, in good faith, insure that their fund has an adequate system in 
place to identify and process the fund’s claims. As developed later in this 
Article, we conclude that Caremark requires institutions to create a monitoring 
mechanism to insure that this system is adequate, and if they learn it is 
inadequate, they should take measures to fix the problem. The obligations of 
the institution’s custodians or other vendors are also examined. 
 
5. These cases were not included in our earlier study because, at that time, we had not 
received all of the data that we needed from the claims administrator who was providing 
them. Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 874. 
6. European investors in American companies have also been reported to be deficient 
in filing claims in securities fraud class actions. Sundeep Tucker, Investors Miss Out on US 
Pay-Outs, FIN. TIMES (London), May 19, 2005, at 27 (estimating that these investors failed to 
collect $2.4 billion awarded to them in securities fraud class action settlements). 
7. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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Turning to the even broader policy implications of our findings, we 
identify several discrete problems that can be addressed to help remedy the 
current situation. First, we believe that the federal courts should create a 
centralized information clearinghouse or website for settlement notices, claims 
forms, and other information about securities fraud class action settlements. 
This information resource would greatly facilitate institutions’ learning about 
settlements and obtaining the materials that they need to file claims. Our first 
recommendation should also help to improve monitoring by the institutions 
themselves or, alternatively, to encourage institutions to hire third-party claims 
monitoring services. Second, the federal courts could also mandate the creation 
and usage of standardized claims forms and trading documentation. Again, this 
would facilitate the claims filing process. Third, we think that institutional 
investors that contract with their custodians to handle their claims filing need to 
improve their monitoring of the process. Fourth, we believe that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) should strengthen its information gathering 
from institutional investors under Securities Exchange Act Section 13(f) so as 
to make that information both more transparent (e.g., identify beneficial owners 
of shares when filing on behalf of another) and easily searchable. Finally, we 
believe that government regulators should establish clear guidelines concerning 
claims filing practices and duties for fiduciaries. 
We conclude our Article with two observations about the implications of 
our results for the goals of securities fraud litigation. Our first point builds off 
our survey respondents’ statements that they do not allocate any recoveries they 
receive to the individual fund beneficiaries but instead to the fund suffering the 
loss or, in some cases, to the institutional investors’ general fund. Our survey, 
therefore, reflects a serious mismatch between the beneficiaries of the 
settlement and those who have been harmed by the securities violation that 
gave rise to the settlement in the first place. Simply stated, many defrauded 
beneficiaries are not compensated for their losses, while others are unjustly 
enriched. Given the enormous importance of institutional investors in the 
market, this mismatch raises serious doubts about whether securities fraud class 
actions can be justified as compensatory mechanisms. Moreover, the poor 
claims filing records of institutional investors exacerbate this mismatch, as 
many investors are systematically deprived of any benefits from these 
settlements. This fact raises more doubts about the compensatory function of 
securities fraud cases. 
Consequently, we believe the more persuasive rationale for these cases is 
the deterrence of fraud. But, in order to accomplish that purpose, the current 
process needs to undergo some changes. We therefore suggest targeting 
securities fraud litigation at the individual wrongdoers’ level and invoking 
vicarious liability only when the company benefits from the fraud. 
Our second concluding point is that it matters whether institutional 
investors file claims, for two reasons. First, pension fund trustees should be 
required to take actions to maximize the value of the assets under their 
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management, such as filing cost-justified claims in securities fraud class action 
settlements, even if these actions do not create “big money.” Using any other 
legal standard for trustees’ fiduciary duties diminishes the value of the duty of 
care. Second, if institutions are active participants in the settlement process, 
they will press for changes in the current system and help bring about needed 
reforms.  
The organization of this Article is straightforward. Part I provides a 
description of the legal and institutional environment within which securities 
class actions thrive. In Part II, we describe our database, the methodology 
employed, and the results of our study of 118 settlements. The potentially 
numerous explanations of why so many financial institutions fail to participate 
in class action settlements are developed in Part III, and in Part IV, we use our 
survey of financial institutions to isolate the likely reasons that financial  
institutions are so frequently missing from the line of claimants that forms at 
the end of securities class actions. In Part V, we examine the legal standards 
that ought to be applied to determine whether pension fund trustees and 
custodian banks that fail to file are liable for their failure and, if so, what the 
damages ought to be. In Part VI, we propose five easy steps to help ensure that 
institutions receive their fair share of settlement awards. In Part VII, we discuss 
two concluding policy implications of our empirical findings and survey 
results. 
I. THE LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT ENVIRONMENT 
Financial institutions include private and public pension funds, life and 
casualty insurance companies, mutual funds, bank trust departments, and 
various endowments. While each owes its existence to a different source of 
funding than the others (insurance companies derive their funding from policy 
premiums and endowments from munificence), all such financial institutions 
share a common bond: wise stewardship of the portfolio managed by each 
financial institution redounds to the benefit of another, be that person a 
pensioner, policyholder, stockholder, beneficiary, or even a faculty member. 
For this reason, the managers of each type of financial institution are subject to 
variously expressed fiduciary obligations that compel their prudent stewardship 
of their portfolio. 
From a different perspective, we can identify financial institutions as 
perhaps the single most important group of investors when designing securities 
regulatory policies. Financial institutions own slightly less than one-half of all 
equity securities,8 and more importantly, from the perspective of securities 
 
8. At the close of the third quarter of 2002, financial institutions held 49.8% of all 
publicly traded equities. See NYSE Fact Book Online, Holdings of Corporate Equities in the 
U.S. by Type of Institution,  http://www.nysedata.com/factbook/vieweredition.asp?mode= 
table&key=2673&category=12 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
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policymaking, their trading dominates, in terms of both dollar and share 
volume, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as well as the large 
capitalization stocks listed on Nasdaq.9 Even though we might conclude that 
retail investors are also important because they provide additional depth to the 
trading on the securities markets, it is the financial institutions whose larger 
trades and greater frequency of trading “make” prices.10 The regulatory 
implications of institutional forces in trading markets are broadly evident, the 
most dramatic being the architecture of the current disclosure mechanisms for 
public offerings, where we find a healthy respect on the part of the SEC for the 
impact financial institutions have on the operation of our securities markets.11 
Reform efforts since then have also focused on the presence or absence of 
institutional investors.12 
Reform efforts for securities class actions complement the potential role of 
financial institutions. A major innovation of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)13 is the “lead plaintiff” provision.14 To 
 
9. One of the best indications of the overall volume of institutional trading is the data 
regarding “block” trades (i.e., trades of at least 10,000 shares of an individual stock). For 
2005 (as of October 2005), block trades represented approximately 26% of total trading 
volume on the NYSE. NYSE Monthly Block Volume, Block Volume Last 12 Months, 
http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/datalib/1022743347436.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
In the Nasdaq National Markets, block trades represented almost 20% of total share volume 
during the period between October 2004 and October 2005. Nasdaq Trader, 
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/asp/tdMarkSpec.asp?RepType=3 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005). 
10. See Eric C. Otness, Comment, Balancing the Interests of Retail and Institutional 
Investors: The Continued Quest for Transparency in Today’s Fragmented Equity Markets, 
96 NW. U. L. REV. 1607, 1616 (2002) (“[E]xecuting an order to buy or sell a large number of 
shares may signal the market of the investors’ intent and, accordingly, drive prices up, in the 
case of a buy order, or down, in the case of a sell order.”); see also DONALD CASSIDY, 
TRADING ON VOLUME: THE KEY TO IDENTIFYING AND PROFITING FROM STOCK PRICE 
REVERSALS 290 (2002) (explaining that the large trading volume of institutional investors in 
the market place combined with their tendency to act alike at critical moments sharply 
increases market volatility).  
11. The SEC’s integrated disclosure procedures and shelf registration process are 
heavily dependent on the view that the securities of companies eligible to use the integrated 
disclosure system are traded in an efficient market, and this view, in part, rests upon a belief 
that institutional investors are both significant traders and owners of such securities. See 
Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-6383 (Mar. 3, 
1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 11,819 (Mar. 19, 1982); Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, 
Measuring Securities Market Efficiency in the Regulatory Setting, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 105, 109 (2000). 
12. Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 855 (explaining that the significant trading and 
ownership interest of institutional investors is the focus of the questions about the scope of 
nonpublic offerings and about making the corporation more responsive to owners). 
13. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
14. The literature on lead plaintiffs is now fairly extensive. See, e.g., Lisa L. Casey, 
Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary 
Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239; Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other 
Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 53 (2001); R. Chris Heck, Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing 
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overcome the concern that securities class actions are “lawyer driven” because 
they are missing an engaged client who can supervise the action’s attorney, the 
PSLRA amended the securities laws to require that, within twenty days of 
filing, the complaint notice must be published inviting members of the class to 
apply to become the suit’s representative. From those who apply to be the lead 
plaintiff, the PSLRA’s reforms call for the court to appoint the “most adequate 
representative,” who is identified by the legislation as the claimant with “the 
largest financial interest” in the suit.15 The assumption underlying the lead 
plaintiff provision is that an investor with a sufficiently large financial stake in 
the suit will be a more diligent monitor than a person with a miniscule claim in 
the suit who may well even have been selected by the suit’s attorney.16 The 
PSLRA tasks the lead plaintiff to select counsel for the suit, albeit subject to 
approval of the court.17 The overall objective of the lead plaintiff provision is 
well understood: harnessing the economic self-interest of a class action member 
to the suit’s attorney. Given the dominance and size of trades by financial 
institutions, we frequently find financial institutions petitioning and being 
chosen to be lead plaintiffs. 
The class action lawyers are not neutral regarding which applicant the 
court selects as the lead plaintiff. When there are competing lead plaintiffs, as 
there frequently are, the selection of lead plaintiff is truly a surrogate means of 
determining which competing firm will be lead, or increasingly co-lead, 
counsel for the class action. Absent such designation, the class action attorney 
assumes the underplayed position of the Maytag repairman. For this reason, 
there is abundant evidence of alliances formed among once-competing law 
firms, whereby they bundle their clients together so that, combined, they 
possess the investors with the “largest financial interest.”18 
 
Institutional Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 
(1999). 
15. The overall strength of the presumption that the petitioning claimant with the 
largest loss is the most adequate plaintiff is evident by the fact that the presumption can only 
be overcome by proof that the petitioner will not adequately represent the class or “is subject 
to unique defenses.” Securities Exchange Act § 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i-iii) 
(2005). 
16. Congress’s consideration of improving the oversight of the class action’s attorney 
coincided with an important study by Professors Weiss and Beckerman, whose data 
revealed, among other interesting facts, that the fifty largest claimants in eighty-two studied 
class action settlements had an average allowable loss of $597,000. Elliot J. Weiss & John S. 
Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce 
Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2089-90 (1995) (stating that 
the fifty largest claimants accounted for an average of 57.5% of all allowable losses among 
claimants). 
17. See Securities Act § 27(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3) (2005); Securities Exchange 
Act § 21D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2005) (detailing procedures for the appointment 
of the most adequate plaintiff and describing the powers of the person so selected). 
18. The lead plaintiff provision provides that the plaintiff or plaintiffs with the largest 
allowable loss is/are presumed to be the most adequate plaintiff(s). This presumption does 
not require that the lead plaintiff be a single investor because the statute permits, and 
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Settlements are the end game for securities class action suits. Even though 
several hundred securities class actions are settled annually, fewer than one or 
two securities class action suits are tried in any year. Before the enactment of 
the PSLRA, because trials were infrequent, there was cause to fear that no 
effective check existed on the litigants to be sure that the litigation was either 
well intentioned or that its settlement reached a justifiable conclusion.19 This 
problem occurred because the plaintiff too frequently was a mere figurehead 
who lacked any effective control over the suit, and the class action attorney was 
preoccupied with her prospective fee. To be sure, no settlement or dismissal of 
a class action can occur without the approval of the court. However, the court is 
also conflicted by a concern for its docket and suffers from a heavy dependence 
on the suit’s attorneys for their justifications for the settlement agreement.20 
A major reason for the lead plaintiff provision’s incorporation into the 
PSLRA is to introduce a self-interested investor-based perspective into the 
litigation and, ultimately, into the settlement process. Absent a real plaintiff, the 
well-recognized concern is that the class action’s counsel’s natural incentive is 
to settle the case for too little recovery on the part of the class members.21 Lead 
plaintiffs were also seen as a reliable governor on the continuance of the suit 
when the facts indicated that the suit was improvidently initiated. Despite these 
lofty visions of the lead plaintiff, there continues to be cause to wonder if the 
lead plaintiff has met its full anticipated potential. For example, there is little 
evidence of lead plaintiffs moving to dismiss a class action suit. Their 
involvement is limited to anointing a firm as lead counsel for the suit. 
The true battleground for securities class action litigation is the pretrial 
motions. The most serious obstacle confronting the class action is withstanding 
 
attorneys frequently advance, aggregation of diverse investors who collectively are “the lead 
plaintiff.” See Heck, supra note 14. For an interesting illustration and discussion of the 
tournament and alliances that arise among competing counsel, see In re Razorfish, Inc., 143 
F. Supp. 2d 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (reviewing efforts of several law firms to “cobble” 
together a diverse group of investors so as to have a client with the largest allowable loss). 
19. The literature concerning the weak incentives for all the participants in class 
actions is extensive. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: 
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) 
[hereinafter Coffee, Bounty Hunter]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s 
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through 
Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action 
Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1991); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative 
Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (1993); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling 
Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2000). 
20. Consider the candor of one federal judge who remarked, “[T]he court starts from 
the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.” In re 
Warner Commc’ns, 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
21. For a close analysis of this problem, see Coffee, Bounty Hunter, supra note 19. 
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the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The PSLRA abandoned nearly a half century 
of notice pleading under the federal rules and substituted a requirement that the 
complaint not only plead facts with particularity, but also, with respect to any 
action involving an allegation of fraud, that the complaint’s facts create a 
“strong inference” of a violation.22 This heightened pleading requirement is 
coupled with another PSLRA reform—the denial of discovery until all pretrial 
motions have been resolved.23 Hence, the facts needed to establish a strong 
inference of fraud must come from sources quite independent of the plaintiffs’ 
lawyer perusing the defendants’ records. Once the complaint has crossed the 
heightened pleading requirement, however, the air is ripe with the odor of 
settlement. There is little for either side to gain by proceeding to trial, and the 
risks to the contingency-fee attorney of proceeding and losing dominate 
whatever optimism she has for how the facts will play to a jury. Thus, we find 
few trials of securities cases. Settlement is the norm. 
Disbursements from the settlement are carried out by the claims 
administrator who is either appointed by the court or simply retained by the 
suit’s attorneys. The most substantial efforts of the claims administrator are 
collecting and reviewing the proof of claims submitted to her. But, before 
receiving such submissions, the claims administrator engages in a good many 
steps designed to give notice of the settlement. Because of the way in which 
stocks are both owned and traded, the claims administrator faces multiple 
challenges in assuring that potential claimants in fact receive notice of the 
settlement. 
In the abstract, it is logical to begin the process of identifying possible 
claimants by obtaining from the issuer’s transfer agent a list of the security’s 
registered holders. However, because most investors hold their securities in 
street names, the list, in most instances, reports that ownership is with CEDE & 
Co., the depositary for most brokers. Even acquiring this information is 
problematic in the case of a bankrupt issuer or when, through merger or 
otherwise, the issuer has ceased to exist, which is frequently the case in settled 
securities class actions. When the issuer continues to exist, the claims 
administrator must penetrate the CEDE listing using the DTC Participant List, a 
database of over 2000 brokers that participate in the Depositary Trust 
Company. Using this database, the claims administrator sends notices of the 
settlement to brokers, asking each broker to assist in identifying customers it 
believes may be included within the settlement.24 The brokerage firms 
 
22. The heightened pleading requirement applies only to claims involving allegations 
of a violation that has as one of its elements a state of mind on the part of the defendant (e.g., 
not a violation that can arise from mere negligence). See Securities Exchange Act 
§ 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2005). 
23. See Securities Act § 27(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77z(b)(1); Securities Exchange Act 
§ 21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
24. The description of the steps taken by settlement and claims administrators to 
identify potential claimants is the result of numerous conversations we have had with several 
COX & THOMAS 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 12/1/2005 10:13:44 AM 
420 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:411 
customarily cooperate, either by returning to the claims administrator printed or 
electronic versions of customers’ addresses or labels with the customers’ 
addresses. A few brokers prefer not to share the customer addresses, so they 
obtain from the claims administrator a sufficient quantity of settlement notices 
and forward them directly to the appropriate customers. 
During this process, potential institutional claimants are even less visible. 
Trading and ownership by institutions is usually much less transparent than that 
of the typical retail investor. This pattern occurs in part because institutions, 
particularly mutual and hedge funds, value trading anonymity more so than do 
retail customers (due to the size of their holdings in individual companies). 
More frequently, though, the problem of identifying institutions results from 
their reliance on an extensive network of advisors who execute trades through 
brokers in the advisor’s name and not in the name of the institution. Simply 
stated, with the institution, there is generally introduced yet another layer of 
market professionals whose goodwill and cooperation are needed for the 
settlement notice to reach the ultimate beneficiary of the settlement. 
To be sure, just as the broker is under a duty to forward the settlement 
notice to its customers whose share ownership is recorded in street name, the 
advisor has a similar obligation to forward the notice to its institutional client. 
But, this web of obligations is far from certain in its ultimate effect of 
imparting notice to the institution. Thus, a further step taken by claims 
administrators is publishing notice in the national financial press, such as The 
Wall Street Journal, USA Today, and Investors Business Daily. Furthermore, 
other services exist that advertise class action settlements. For example, our 
survey revealed that many institutions learned of the suit and settlement 
through their subscription to Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) 
Securities Class Action Services. We were also advised that some law firms 
provide these services to institutional investors, perhaps in hopes of gaining 
their future business. There are also independent third-party claims advisory 
services that search for such notices on behalf of their clients. 
II. SETTLEMENT STUDY METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
In order to obtain a sample of securities fraud settlements, we asked three 
settlement administrators to help us identify a group of securities fraud class 
action settlements and provide us with the settlement notices from these 
cases.25 We used these notices to gather a wide variety of information about 
 
administrators, as well as an examination of public filings related to settled class actions 
where administrators detail their efforts. See, e.g., Affidavit of Brian Burke, In re Health 
Mgmt. Systems Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Affidavit of Ellen 
Riley, Alpern v. Utilicorp United Inc., 84 F.3d 1525 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Affidavit of G. Peter 
Buchband, State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Goldfield (N.D. Tex. 1999) (affidavits on file with 
authors). 
25. A more detailed explanation of our methodology is found in Cox & Thomas, supra 
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these cases, including the identity of the lead plaintiff for post-PSLRA cases 
and the class period for each case. 
We then generated two additional types of data. First, for each settlement 
in our sample, we used SEC Form 13F26 data to determine which institutions 
traded stock in the company during the class period. After we generated this list 
of the institutional investors, we compared it with our claims data to see if these 
institutions filed claims in the securities class action settlements. In our earlier 
work, we set forth the results of this comparison for the relatively small number 
of cases that we obtained from two of the three claims administrators. 
In this Article, we present the results for the much larger sample that we 
received from Claims Administrator Three. All settlements listed here involved 
purchaser classes. As before, we create a list of Form 13F filers that reported 
purchases during the sample period and compare it with the names of the 
beneficial owners that filed claims in the settlement. Using the results of this 
comparison, we calculate the percentage of Form 13F traders that file claims in 
each settlement. 
Table 1 sets forth this information by sample company, as well as data on 
the average, median, minimum, and maximum size of the claim for each 
institution that filed a claim. We note that we have incomplete information on 
several of the settlements (indicated by the letters NA, and in such instances, 
they are not included in the totals for any of the columns). 
Table 1. Claims Administrator Three Data on Settlements; 13F Data on Filing  
Case No. Filing 
No. 
Trading 
Percent 
Filing 
Mean 
Loss 
Median 
Loss 
Minimum 
Loss 
Maximum 
Loss 
1 87 240 36.25% 1,938,373 239,274 11,907 33,289,462 
2 5 22 22.73% 802,682 473,280 22,943 1,808,569 
3 5 19 26.32% 798,489 302,572 11,940 2,079,067 
4 25 83 30.12% 318,412 122,539 10,058 2,327,380 
5 76 191 39.79% 427,208 130,981 13,125 8,014,688 
6 45 169 26.63% 270,952 92,055 11,400 2,925,315 
7 30 137 21.90% 398,678 40,508 11,700 8,286,060 
8 3 20 15.00% 388,944 105,230 33,962 1,027,641 
9 75 206 36.41% 2,013,118 412,937 10,200 60,367,425 
10 51 348 14.66% 1,154,575 127,603 11,768 32,526,854 
11 54 134 40.30% 1,539,851 452,786 10,315 23,312,885 
12 36 92 39.13% 2,643,492 80,794 11,625 64,772,109 
13 10 21 47.62% 278,114 250,133 12,649 670,611 
 
note 3, at 871-74. 
26. Both Securities Exchange Act § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2005) and 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.13f-1 (2005) require institutional investment managers who have at least $100 million 
to file Form 13F within forty-five days of each fiscal quarter detailing the holdings of certain 
equities (i.e., those subject to the early warning provision of section 13(d)(1) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2005)). 
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14 10 28 35.71% 654,397 291,906 24,400 2,719,875 
15 9 26 34.62% 1,042,362 278,322 15,100 7,175,025 
16 70 236 29.66% 996,198 174,944 10,604 13,204,931 
17 22 41 53.66% 973,664 519,792 12,506 5,525,283 
18 51 142 35.92% 914,650 102,951 13,722 16,448,536 
19 10 145 6.90% 156,530 73,245 14,900 604,632 
20 69 145 47.59% 731,021 194,130 15,840 11,708,774 
21 16 46 34.78% 356,911 268,349 22,863 1,222,040 
22 8 47 17.02% 39,886 33,195 10,600 91,729 
23 24 69 34.78% 1,097,354 358,055 14,383 6,208,669 
24 17 48 35.42% 1,968,882 467,362 12,980 12,714,092 
25 15 51 29.41% 1,103,994 275,298 13,283 12,409,544 
26 21 82 25.61% 228,325 75,353 10,603 2,089,880 
27 45 117 38.46% 1,504,321 197,746 10,363 14,799,408 
28 9 62 14.52% 230,788 155,844 52,500 489,225 
29 14 69 20.29% 273,330 86,388 11,625 1,714,650 
30 12 47 25.53% 259,980 98,796 10,751 1,229,699 
31 35 116 30.17% 1,803,769 482,900 25,594 35,953,038 
32 12 80 15.00% 122,245 50,813 10,000 710,500 
33 16 43 37.21% 1,017,996 175,621 11,790 4,338,355 
34 15 60 25.00% 306,287 112,375 10,150 1,012,704 
35 32 138 23.19% 722,891 174,839 10,500 5,889,279 
36 25 145 17.24% 199,067 118,472 10,075 799,955 
37 40 90 44.44% 1,323,568 546,197 27,171 11,231,263 
38 3 24 12.50% 96,708 78,023 13,484 198,617 
39 10 40 25.00% 252,150 220,834 21,095 830,332 
40 21 77 27.27% 305,215 153,750 10,589 1,127,500 
41 2 16 12.50% 46,202 46,202 37,699 54,705 
42 40 85 47.06% 995,358 419,912 11,898 7,775,718 
43 73 198 36.87% 465,905 105,750 10,363 9,438,575 
44 45 91 49.45% 858,625 237,500 12,625 12,679,950 
45 58 162 35.80% 1,633,779 349,323 10,500 26,700,814 
46 31 93 33.33% 647,646 138,443 12,512 6,675,624 
47 17 51 33.33% 447,146 127,600 15,990 3,500,000 
48 26 56 46.43% 875,682 559,122 18,998 4,804,085 
49 2 15 13.33% 70,044 70,044 17,588 122,500 
50 16 131 12.21% 385,371 168,393 12,275 1,787,270 
51 16 49 32.65% 898,633 369,257 19,793 4,098,965 
52 9 21 42.86% 384,100 197,148 22,863 990,039 
53 17 44 38.64% 854,210 788,832 17,432 2,139,050 
54 14 37 37.84% 997,459 721,925 26,161 2,780,042 
55 57 126 45.24% 1,762,263 495,891 10,544 18,404,236 
56 14 57 24.56% 708,137 272,353 14,230 3,313,173 
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57 0 3 0.00% NA NA NA NA 
58 16 78 20.51% 313,450 231,645 17,550 955,404 
59 1 11 9.09% 207,000 207,000 207,000 207,000 
60 17 48 35.42% 726,707 243,771 26,478 3,211,050 
61 5 13 38.46% 472,613 554,625 18,275 850,000 
62 14 44 31.82% 826,697 267,413 71,363 4,828,552 
63 21 65 32.31% 1,376,085 373,171 15,757 21,477,801 
64 20 53 37.74% 631,615 292,957 14,165 3,065,586 
65 41 91 45.06% 2,649,033 610,400 12,315 55,306,114 
66 26 76 34.21% 1,049,458 154,814 12,028 10,128,841 
67 49 128 38.28% 694,324 157,825 10,680 5,155,358 
68 3 19 15.79% 465,589 252,939 228,014 915,813 
69 4 21 19.05% 99,941 91,394 11,651 205,325 
70 45 107 42.06% 2,005,097 662,093 12,463 12,940,277 
71 132 245 53.88% 5,541,965 633,915 10,123 155,885,624 
72 3 22 13.64% 464,578 100,942 50,132 1,242,660 
73 13 44 29.55% 733,225 152,580 11,348 6,018,931 
74 0 22 0.00% NA NA NA NA 
75 1 12 8.33% 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500 
76 11 35 31.43% 112,005 70,750 16,320 309,955 
77 17 38 44.74% 916,865 280,955 54,375 4,795,292 
78 2 29 6.90% 754,340 754,340 89,902 1,418,778 
79 2 29 6.90% 259,461 259,461 43,247 475,674 
80 24 84 28.57% 285,032 87,245 10,253 2,344,929 
81 24 74 32.43% 685,447 176,031 11,905 6,043,538 
82 1 18 5.56% 31,075 31,075 31,075 31,075 
83 1 16 6.25% 2,622,923 2,622,923 2,622,923 2,622,923 
84 11 51 21.57% 109,288 46,394 14,714 313,981 
85 44 143 30.77% 2,066,510 142,664 11,613 67,291,180 
86 13 36 36.11% 133,386 102,664 41,938 370,156 
87 2 11 18.18% 459,162 459,162 85,779 832,545 
88 27 99 27.27% 618,554 323,388 14,632 7,066,264 
89 4 27 14.82% 161,922 147,813 51,063 301,000 
90 37 163 22.70% 336,473 109,058 10,863 4,246,474 
91 19 56 33.93% 1,078,353 253,754 15,054 11,399,104 
92 41 144 28.47% 387,208 125,450 13,050 7,428,200 
93 17 33 51.52% 1,057,035 345,039 26,853 4,317,676 
94 0 9 0.00% NA NA NA NA 
95 42 110 38.18% 2,989,015 387,642 11,450 49,066,864 
96 5 27 18.52% 376,590 163,013 68,850 980,988 
97 95 213 44.60% 684,700 237,607 11,122 9,373,186 
98 42 108 38.89% 4,962,839 633,925 15,181 75,226,325 
99 8 18 44.44% 159,531 102,173 13,570 445,963 
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100 22 74 29.73% 1,195,357 221,113 19,600 6,651,309 
101 25 58 43.10% 1,259,327 308,997 14,733 9,679,460 
102 12 67 17.91% 288,193 40,875 13,500 2,593,563 
103 11 78 14.10% 184,232 92,098 21,306 482,720 
104 21 63 33.33% 2,244,347 1,061,877 15,785 19,342,542 
105 21 89 23.60% 351,910 60,500 14,400 3,384,000 
106 21 89 23.60% 557,668 206,185 15,070 2,262,413 
107 16 52 30.77% 1,538,348 1,309,047 13,294 4,527,484 
108 6 37 16.22% 239,140 184,793 48,750 738,745 
109 0 7 0.00% NA NA NA NA 
110 47 116 40.52% 474,472 164,947 10,500 7,066,611 
111 31 99 31.31% 509,413 224,037 10,117 3,839,542 
112 36 139 25.90% 453,745 105,296 11,680 3,701,560 
113 10 44 22.73% 411,550 180,846 31,150 2,718,405 
114 11 44 25.00% 1,973,029 392,312 26,664 7,123,741 
115 44 118 37.29% 600,364 191,940 13,649 6,514,878 
116 10 39 25.64% 1,051,964 174,585 13,287 9,001,675 
117 1 7 14.29% 137,955 137,955 137,955 137,955 
118 2 35 5.71% 42,336 42,336 32,620 52,052 
Total 2,817 9,056 NA NA NA NA NA 
Mean 24 77 28.09% 848,376 277,405 47,124 10,070,578 
Median 17 58 29.70% 625,085 193,035 13,685 3,600,780 
Min. 0 3 0.00% 10,500 10,500 10,000 10,500 
Max. 132 348 53.88% 5,541,965 2,622,923 2,622,923 155,885,624 
Several key points emerge from these data. First, on average, roughly 28% 
of eligible institutional investors file claims in these settlements. The median 
value is almost identical at 29.7%. This value falls squarely within the 25% to 
33% range that we found in our earlier research. 
The average mean loss is very substantial in these cases: almost $850,000. 
This amount is substantially higher than the average loss of the two samples we 
previously analyzed (the first group had an average loss of $102,644, while the 
second set showed average losses of $461,074). This difference indicates that 
our results are robust even in a sample of significantly larger settlements. We 
also present data on median settlement values. We find that the average median 
loss is roughly $275,000, which is substantially lower than the almost $850,000 
average value reported in Table 1. Nevertheless, even the median loss is a large 
number that would seem to indicate that many institutions have suffered 
significant losses in these cases. 
Of course, what most likely should guide the decision whether to file a 
claim is not the loss suffered, but the recovery expected. Here, we can only 
draw on our earlier data for a small sample of cases, which show that average 
recovery rates are about one-third of losses. Applying this value to the numbers 
shown in the previous paragraph would give an average mean recovery of 
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around $280,000, or an average median recovery of more than $90,000. To our 
eyes, this amount would seem to be a significant return on the small costs (in 
terms of time and money) of filing a claim in a securities fraud class action 
settlement. We would again (as in our earlier work) caution against putting too 
much stock in the precise numbers, but we do think that they indicate that there 
is a substantial return to filing claims and a large number of nonfiling 
institutions. Of course, the institutions with the largest holdings would realize 
far greater returns from filing claims. 
Thus, our data provide an inescapable and startling conclusion: Financial 
institutions with significant provable losses fail at an alarming rate 
(approximately seventy percent) to submit their claims in settled securities class 
actions. Moreover, not only are their losses significant, but the sums of money 
they likely would gain by filing claims are also not trivial, both in the aggregate 
and on an average individual fund basis. 
III. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR SLUMBERING 
No doubt there are multiple explanations why institutions have such a 
dismal record for submitting their claims in settled securities class actions. Our 
conversations with participants in the process and theory are the basis for us to 
formulate several hypotheses which we develop below. 
A. Sleeping with the Enemy 
The agency cost implicit in business organizations is well understood. 
Because managers seek to maximize their own utility, their actions do not 
always redound to the benefit of the firm’s owners or to the benefit of others 
for whom the managers are stewards of assets that are not owned by the 
managers. Indeed, managers, because they typically own a small percentage of 
the firm, have a natural incentive to pursue strategies that benefit themselves 
disproportionately vis-à-vis the firm’s owners. Agency costs are not confined to 
smokestack industries. They persist across all organization forms, including 
financial service firms such as trusts, endowments, and mutual funds.27 
 
27. This topic has been best explored in the context of whether financial institutions 
are likely to play a significant role in the governance of their portfolio companies. See, e.g., 
Jayne W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. 
REV. 1135 (1991) (reviewing the changing role of institutional investors and suggesting that 
they are poised to improve corporate performance through their impact on the composition 
and processes followed by boards of directors); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: 
The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992) [hereinafter 
Black, Agents Watching Agents] (examining a variety of regulatory and cultural forces that 
impact the ability of various types of financial institutions to monitor the stewardship of their 
portfolio companies); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 520 (1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined] (examining, among 
other things, the various conflicts of interest that different types of financial institutions face 
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Over the last decade, regulatory efforts have sought to unleash the 
disciplining force of financial institutions to improve the stewardship of 
corporate managers. The thesis of these reforms is that financial institutions, 
because of their significant ownership interest and financial acumen, can be 
expected to be vigilant and responsible monitors of managers. Thus, in 1992, 
the SEC greatly liberalized the proxy rules to permit financial institutions not 
only to announce their positions on matters submitted to the stockholders, but 
also to encourage other financial institutions to follow a common course in 
voting their proxies.28 The SEC abbreviated the disclosures that are required 
for significant holders of publicly traded shares as well, thus reducing some 
regulatory friction facing institutions that wish to hold more than five percent 
of a firm’s voting shares but do not seek to control that firm.29 
More recently, the SEC mandated that mutual funds disclose annually how 
they vote their fund’s proxies on matters coming before the shareholders of 
their portfolio companies.30 The aspiration for this development is not so much 
to assure that the advisor votes in the elections conducted by portfolio 
 
that interfere with their being an effective monitor of managers); Bernard S. Black, The 
Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 
(1992) (finding from a review of diverse empirical studies that there is a need for a strong 
shareholder voice to address problems such as excess cash accumulations, harmful 
acquisition strategies, and excessive executive compensation, but not addressing whether 
institutional investors can be expected to effectively provide that voice); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1277 (1991) (arguing that institutions’ preference for liquidity and access to insiders 
restricts their willingness to involve themselves as monitors); Edward B. Rock, The Logic 
and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991) 
(arguing that effective monitoring by institutional investors, while promising, is hampered 
by substantial agency costs).  
28. “The amendments eliminate unnecessary regulatory obstacles to the exchange of 
views and opinions by shareholders and others concerning management performance and 
initiatives presented for a vote of shareholders.” Regulation of Communications Among 
Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992) 
(amending proxy rules promulgated under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l) 
(2005), to exclude from the definition of “proxy solicitation” a security holder’s public 
announcement of how he or she intends to vote, and amending 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) to 
state that any communication by or on behalf of any person who does not seek the power to 
act as proxy is exempt from the proxy regulations). The literature on the 1992 Proxy 
Amendments is extensive. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The 
Case for Proxy Reform, 17 J. CORP. L. 49 (1991); Joseph Evan Calio & Rafael Xavier 
Zahralddin, The Securities and Exchange Commission’s 1992 Proxy Amendments: Questions 
of Accountability, 14 PACE L. REV. 459 (1994); Norma M. Sharara & Anne E. Hoke-
Witherspoon, The Evolution of the 1992 Shareholder Communication Proxy Rules and Their 
Impact on Corporate Governance, 49 BUS. LAW. 327 (1993); Jill A. Hornstein, Note, Proxy 
Solicitation Redefined: The SEC Takes an Incremental Step Toward Effective Corporate 
Governance, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1129 (1993). 
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b) (2005).  
30. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8188 (Jan. 31, 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm. 
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companies but rather that, when exercising this franchise, they do so with a 
regard for the interests of the fund’s holders.31 That is, the regulatory objective 
is the belief that greater transparency is more likely to align the advisor’s 
voting decisions with those of the fund’s beneficiaries. Implicit in this 
aspiration is the belief that advisors are likely to march to a quite different beat 
than do the fund’s holders. There is also the collateral benefit of reducing the 
likelihood that advisors will garner rents from portfolio companies by currying 
favor with their managers in how they exercise their power to vote the 
portfolio’s shares. 
Even though financial institutions are not monolithic in their missions or 
operations, many do face a similar source of potential conflict to their managers 
fulfilling their fiduciary responsibilities by claiming their rightful share of 
settlement funds.32 Banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies, three of the 
five largest classes of financial institutions, are each vendors of financial 
services and products. Their customers include corporations and accounting 
firms, which are the grist of securities class actions. And, to the extent that 
public pension funds and endowments appear not to have the same conflicts as 
other types of institutions, those conflicts appear when the public pension fund 
or endowment depends on outside money managers who have such conflicts.33 
Financial service providers try not to align themselves with protagonists of 
their clientele.34 This fact may explain why we find no recorded case where a 
bank, mutual fund, or insurance company has served as a lead plaintiff in a 
securities class action. Why should a firm step forward to lead the assault on 
executives who have issued misleading reports if such visibility could pose 
problems in soliciting banking, insurance, or pension services from other 
executives who likely share the common view in executive suites that most 
securities class action suits are strike suits?35 Standing shoulder to shoulder 
with “class action lawyers” does not win one friends in the executive suites of 
America or at the club. Moreover, there is only the thinnest social divide 
between executives of banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds and 
executives of industrial firms. These are groups of individuals who understand 
one another and are aware of the price to be incurred by failing to honor that 
 
31. Id. (noting that fund investors may “benefit from the improvement to corporate 
governance that results from more conscientious proxy voting by fund managers”). 
32. See generally supra note 27. 
33. See Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 27, at 596-97 (making 
this point in reference to private pension funds). 
34. Thus, we find that many types of financial institutions are not themselves the 
proponents of a bylaw or other proposal that will alter the governance of their portfolio 
companies, although they will, at times, vote in favor of such a proposal when advanced by 
another less conflicted institution. See Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 27, at 
883-84. More pointedly, “[f]or a conflicted institution, crossing the street in a crowd is safer 
than crossing alone.” Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 27, at 606. 
35. We recognize that an institution may be averse to participating in individual class 
action recoveries if it believes that a particular case is just extorting money from a company. 
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understanding.36 
The same social and commercial forces that prevent banks, mutual funds, 
and insurance companies from stepping forward to be a lead plaintiff may also 
weaken the commitment of their managers to assure the firm reaps the full 
advantage of securities class action litigation. That which is distasteful socially 
and harmful to business is easily accorded a low priority on the fund 
executive’s agenda. Such benign neglect is understandable for several other 
reasons as well. A firm that believes its financial success arises from managing 
funds for others (i.e., a mutual fund advisor) or from playing the actuarial game 
(i.e., an insurance company) is not likely to place a high value on establishing 
and monitoring procedures to assure it participates in settlements affecting its 
portfolio companies. Instead, submitting claims is likely to be viewed as 
subsidiary to what the firm perceives to be its primary operations. Also, the 
rewards to the firm of having a reasonably designed and administered system to 
submit claims are likely to be slight relative to the firm’s other metrics of 
success, so monitoring the claims process earns little, if any, executive 
attention.37 As a result, this metric is not a metric of success that gets 
measured, managed, or ultimately rewarded. When added to the cultural 
baggage class actions enjoy in the executive suites, it is hard to fathom who 
would be a champion for reviewing the firm’s internal procedures for 
submitting proof of claims in settled securities class actions.38 
 
36. Cf. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological 
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 
(1985) (examining the social and psychological forces, among which is membership in the 
same social strata, that can impede the decision to sue). 
37. For the view that pension fund trustees’ and managers’ tenure is largely invariant 
to the overall performance of the fund, see Barnard, supra note 27, at 1140-41. 
38. Those who advise mutual fund managers have misrepresented our position 
regarding who has a fiduciary obligation and the nature of that obligation when pursuing 
claims in settled securities class actions. See Steven W. Stone & Ryan F. Helmrich, The Role 
of Investment Advisers in Client Class Action Claims, 12 INV. LAWYER 17 (2005), available 
at http://morganlewis.com/pubs/Stone_InvestmentLawyer-Oct05.pdf. Their criticism of our 
position conflates the decision to monitor whether the fund has reasonable processes 
whereby it can participate in settled securities class actions with the decision whether to opt 
out of a newly initiated securities class action or even participate as a lead plaintiff. We 
earlier said that the decisions with respect to the former are quite different from those 
involved in the latter. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 861-62. Also, no one disagrees 
that mutual fund officers and directors are bound by fiduciary obligations that exist at 
common law and apply across the board to officers and directors. Stone and Helmrich’s 
disagreement is that these obligations extend to the fund’s external advisor, whom they see 
as providing only investment advice and not guidance on noninvestment internal operations. 
This position overlooks the substantial qualification that we emphasized in our earlier article, 
namely that the applicable standard “involves some element of intent such that the standard 
is more akin to that of recklessness.” Id. at 864. Following the wide interest in our 2002 pilot 
study, following the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations’ ongoing 
interest in the funds’ procedures for identifying possible settlements in which they may 
participate, and now, following the more than fifty suits that have been filed against advisers 
for failure to pursue claims in settled securities class actions (in which about one-half have 
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B. A Rolling Stone Gathers No Moss 
The data we have collected in our ongoing studies of securities class action 
settlements reflect that the median length of a class period is 10.5 months and 
that settlement notices are not circulated on average until 26.7 months after the 
end of the class action period. This delay represents an average total time in 
excess of three years that may have elapsed since an institution traded the 
security that qualified it to participate in the settlement. If we assume that 
institutions on average purchased or sold in the middle of the class action 
period, the length of time between the trade that qualifies it for membership in 
the class and the settlement is a very long time, about thirty-two months. 
Moreover, there is a fairly broad distribution around these median points so that 
we can safely say four years or more can elapse between the date of a trade that 
occurred during the front end of the class action period and the publication of 
notice of a settlement. This observation has serious implications for whether the 
institution is likely to file a claim in settlement. 
Most financial institutions do not manage their own funds but instead 
oversee a stable of investment advisors. A well-managed fund periodically 
reviews the performance of its advisors, terminating its relationship with under-
performing advisors and substituting in their places those who emerge from 
ongoing beauty contests. Moreover, institutions and their advisors, with some 
frequency, change their custodian banks. Such changes are important because 
often it is the custodian bank that is expected to file claims for institutions as 
well as handle many of their back-office duties. 
A departing investment advisor or custodian bank does not customarily 
forward to the institution, or its successors, the trading records for the portfolio 
it had previously handled. Therefore, a succeeding advisor, custodian, or the 
institution itself will not have at hand sufficient information to evaluate 
whether it has a provable claim that can be submitted to the settlement 
administrator, but will need to depend on its predecessors to provide these data. 
Furthermore, the settlement administrator’s notice of a settlement may well 
be sent to the terminated investment advisor, or custodian, and not to the 
institution or its current advisors or custodian bank. As described earlier, one 
customary approach of claims administrators for imparting notice is relying 
upon the CEDE list of beneficial ownership. This step likely identifies the 
advisor or custodian so that the notice will be forwarded to it. Whether this 
produces a submitted claim necessarily depends on the cooperation of the 
earlier terminated advisor, or bank, as well as that advisor, or bank, having 
retained reliable records covering its former client’s trading. The problems of 
forwarding the notice are exacerbated by the passage of time between the date 
 
been dismissed because the funds could prove they did submit claims), we believe a fund 
sponsored by an advisor that systematically and consciously ignored any possible 
participation in settled securities class actions would have acted recklessly. 
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of the trade that qualifies the institution’s claim for participation in the 
settlement and when the settlement notice is published. As seen above, several 
years customarily separate the institution’s trade that qualifies it as a member of 
a class and the circulation of the settlement notice. Although it is sound practice 
for an advisor to retain records pertinent to its current clientele, the appeal of 
retaining such records for former clients is much weaker.39 
A further consideration is whether the terminated advisor can expect any 
rewards for its efforts to identify whether a former client has a claim to be 
submitted and to assemble the information needed for submission. Certainly, 
one can attribute some goodwill to doing so, but the weight the institution 
assigns to such responsible behavior on the part of its former advisor pales in 
comparison with the dominant consideration in selecting advisors generally, 
namely portfolio performance, in which the advisor has already been found 
wanting. Similar considerations would apply for a former custodian bank. 
C. Voting with Their Feet 
Securities class actions, even in the post-PSLRA era, continue to have a 
negative public image. Frankly, they are damned by the company they keep.40 
They are perceived as resulting in small sums for class members and generous 
fees for the suits’ attorneys. Our own data support the conclusion that 
settlements in absolute dollars are fairly sizeable, but relative to the estimated 
losses suffered by the class members, settlements yield small percentage 
recoveries, with the bulk of such suits yielding less than ten cents on each 
dollar of provable losses.41 To the extent these perceptions are shared by an 
institution’s managers, they weaken the institution’s commitment to systematic 
oversight of claims submissions when the institution is the beneficiary of a 
settled class action. 
A further consideration is how the institution’s managers likely frame their 
evaluations of what commitment to make toward installing procedures for 
submitting and monitoring claims in settled securities class actions. For 
example, if the question is evaluated in the context of whether it is cost-
effective to install a reliable process for identifying probable claims, obtaining 
the relevant documentation to submit a claim, and submitting the claim, then 
we might expect a reasonable commitment level. The returns are easily 
 
39. Even if it has retained these records, the rapid pace of technological change may 
render them inaccessible at any reasonable cost. For example, if the records were kept in an 
electronic file on a now antiquated system, they may no longer be machine readable by new 
software systems. Although hand tabulation may still be possible, it is extremely costly. 
40. See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 497, 498-99 (1997) (reviewing some of the reasons the public holds class action awards 
in low esteem). 
41. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas (with assistance of Dana Kiku), SEC 
Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 769, 771 (2004). 
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determined, while the costs are low because they involve low-skill 
administrative tasks that do not require the efforts of a professional. Nor do 
these tasks require a significant number of personnel, especially if these tasks 
are largely contracted out to a custodian bank. Compared to the low investment 
that we believe would be necessary to reasonably staff a protocol to assure 
submitting claims in settled actions, our data suggest that the expected returns 
of such staffing would not just cover the costs of such a procedure but would 
likely yield a fairly high positive return on those costs. 
However, institutional managers who instead assess the desirability of 
identifying and submitting claims in the context of the overall activities of the 
fund can easily conclude that there are far better places to expend the fund’s 
resources. That is, managers who view their objective as being well-performing 
traders (i.e., beating the market) are less likely to value operations that are 
removed from that role.42 For example, a few fund managers commented rather 
casually to us that they did not value submitting claims because the expected 
gains of doing so were dwarfed by both the size of the fund’s assets and the 
average yearly returns earned by the fund through wise investment strategies.43 
D. Who’s on First 
The current operating environment for monitoring notice of settlements 
likely includes a good amount of incompleteness in terms of relative 
responsibilities. Despite the admirable and nontrivial efforts of claims 
administrators to reach possible claimants, the system in large part depends on 
there being a watchful eye on the part of the institutions. Notices directed to 
custodians, advisors, or brokerage firms may not be received or, if received, 
may not be forwarded to the individual who has responsibility for determining 
 
42. Hence, Professor Black observes that a problem of the money-manager culture is 
the managers’ focus on trading rather than the diligent pursuit of strategies that could 
improve the governance and performance of their portfolio companies. See Black, Agents 
Watching Agents, supra note 27, at 885-86. 
43. Such responses are not inconsistent with the view that money managers and fund 
managers do have strong market-based incentives to improve the overall performance of 
their fund. See, e.g., id. at 877-81 (identifying bonuses and reputational advancement as two 
considerations of both private and public fund managers). Because the relative gains through 
diligent pursuit of settlement funds are not likely to have a material impact on either the 
money or the fund manager’s income or reputation, it is understandable that devoting limited 
executive time to oversight of settlement submissions will be crowded out by strategies the 
manager believes he or she can pursue that will result in more significant rewards. At the 
same time, Professor Black observes that managers of public pension funds are less likely to 
have the same market-based incentives. Id. at 878. If this observation were the case, we 
would expect that such managers would indeed allocate more of their time to assuring that 
their fund had reasonably designed procedures to pursue their rightful share of settlements. 
And, the market incentives are weakest for institutions like banks and insurance companies 
that emphasize to their client base their “stability” rather than simply their performance. Id. 
at 882. 
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whether the institution has a provable claim and wishes to submit it to the 
claims administrator. 
This oversight might also be due to a failure of the institution to clearly 
specify in its contract with its custodian, advisor, or broker the procedures to be 
followed with respect to handling possible claims. Moreover, the institution’s 
external agent may not have a definitive protocol to follow when receiving a 
notice from the claims administrator. These problems are exacerbated in the 
case in which the custodian, advisor, or brokerage firm has an unclear 
obligation to peruse the financial press and other publications for notices of 
settlements. The situation is ripe with the possibility of mutual 
misunderstandings whereby the institution believes its interest is being 
addressed by its custodian and advisor, when in fact the custodian or advisor 
believes it has little or no responsibility to monitor settlement notices. 
There is also the distinct possibility that breakdowns occur within the 
institution or the custodian. Lines of authority, once clearly established, may, 
with the passage of time and personnel, become blurred or forgotten. One can 
imagine that institutions or custodians could assign to one of their staffers 
responsibility for handling all matters related to the institution’s possible 
securities claims. This obligation is not likely to be either the sole or primary 
obligation of the employee. When an employee is evaluated on other functions, 
those tasks that are evaluated will of course enjoy a higher order of attention by 
the employee in terms of how the employee allocates his time. And, as 
employees come and go in that position, there may be further blurring of that 
position’s responsibilities with respect to monitoring custodians, advisors, or 
publications for possible provable claims. 
In sum, all the above-mentioned problems have a common source: a lack 
of monitoring by the management of the institution. Each institution should 
periodically evaluate whether its procedures and personnel are performing 
reasonably well. This is an area where complacency can easily take hold, 
especially since the institution’s managers likely prize money management 
more highly than the pursuit of settlements. We also speculate that the system 
for imparting notice and identifying possible claims may well exacerbate 
cultural and economic forces such as those described above. That is, the greater 
the friction and uncertainty that attend the process institutions must follow to 
submit a claim, the more likely it is that the institution’s managers will 
succumb to the temptations to slumber. Thus, any solution must address those 
features of the claims process that pose uncertainty or difficulty on the part of 
claimants. 
IV. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY RESULTS 
To try to unpack how institutional investors deal with the claims filing 
process, we surveyed different groups of institutions about their practices in the 
area. Initially, in early 2002, we designed a short survey that focused on three 
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main issues: How did institutional investors get notice of settlements? Did they 
know of any settlements of which they did not get notice? And, how did they 
determine whether or not to file a claim in the settlements about which they 
heard? We asked the Council for Institutional Investors (CII) to distribute the 
survey to its membership,44 and we also distributed copies to a large number of 
smaller public pension funds at a conference of police and fire pension funds. 
We received only twelve completed surveys, three from CII members and nine 
from the police and fire pension funds. 
Our first question concerned how these investors received notice of 
settlements in securities fraud class actions. Three-quarters of the respondents 
replied that their primary (or exclusive) source of information was their 
custodian bank, with smaller numbers reporting they had been contacted by 
either the claims administrators or the company directly or that an employee of 
the fund had read about the settlement in the financial press.45 However, only 
four of the twelve respondents had an employee who was responsible for 
regularly checking the financial press for settlement notices. We believe this 
failure to designate an employee with responsibility to monitor various outlets 
for notices of settlements is a significant one. 
We then asked the investors if there had ever been a settlement in which 
they later learned they had not received a notice. Seven of the twelve 
institutions replied this had “never” occurred, two investors said it had 
happened “a few” times, two responded they had not received a notice “some” 
times, and one investor did not reply to this question. Interestingly, one 
respondent that claimed it had never missed a settlement notice also stated that 
it had never received any such notices. 
Turning to the claims filing process, we asked two questions: Who filed 
claims for the institution, and when did they decide to file claims?46 Each of 
the CII respondents stated that their custodian banks filed all potential claims 
for them.47 Of note is that the police and fire funds also appeared, in our 
survey, less likely to file all claims irrespective of their value. Before filing a 
claim, they considered the size of the fund’s loss, its estimated recovery, the 
 
44. CII included a paragraph about the survey in its newsletter. This short note directed 
interested members to our website where they could fill out the survey. 
45. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and investors typically reported two 
or three sources of information about settlements. 
46. The reader should be aware that this discussion relates only to securities that are 
held beneficially by the institutions. Some institutions hold only a small percentage of their 
equity holdings beneficially because they have large holdings in commingled or indexed 
funds, which are managed by outside money managers. These outside managers are expected 
to file claims for the benefit of these funds, with the investors in the fund ultimately 
benefiting. However, this fact does not present a problem for the purposes of supra Part II 
because the institutions would not report these holdings on their Schedule 13F. 
47. The police and fire funds were more diverse in their responses: two delegated 
claims filing to their custodians, while the other seven had internal employees, such as a plan 
administrator, chief accountant, or staff attorney, make these filings. 
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size of the overall settlement, the importance of the stock in their portfolio, the 
time and effort involved in filing a claim, and any publicity surrounding the 
case. 
The results of this initial survey were useful to us in several ways. First, 
they highlighted the importance of the custodian bank in the claims filing 
process, both as a source of information about settlements and as the party 
responsible in many instances for filing the claims themselves, particularly at 
the larger public pension funds. Second, this survey brought out two very 
different approaches taken by institutions to claims filing. One set of 
institutions outsourced the entire process of gathering notices and filing claims 
to a third party, the custodian bank, while the second set of institutions relied 
largely on internal employees to gather and file claims. Finally, we were also 
intrigued by the difference in claims filing at the different size institutions, with 
the larger public pension funds filing all claims, irrespective of their value, and 
the police and fire funds taking a more textured approach, which considered the 
costs and benefits of making a claim. 
With these points in mind, we designed a second, much longer 
questionnaire on institutional claims filing practices. At various points during 
2003, we mailed this questionnaire to several hundred institutions, including all 
of the members of CII and several other institutional investor organizations. 
This second questionnaire focused on whether the institution used an internal or 
external claims filing process and how that process worked, the factors 
affecting the institution’s decision to file claims, the costs of filing claims and 
how they are allocated, claims monitoring by institutions, allocation of any 
recoveries to the fund, and the institution’s understanding about its duty to file 
claims. 
We received twenty-three replies to this questionnaire:48 twenty from 
public pension funds, two from private pension funds, and one from a bank. 
Given the proprietary nature of the information that we were requesting and the 
length of the questionnaire, it is perhaps not surprising that the response rate 
was so low. Because we were only trying to obtain a descriptive view of how 
the claims filing system works, and not seeking to draw statistical inferences 
from the data that we collected, we do not view the small percentage of replies 
as a serious problem. 
Our initial questions revisited the issue of whether there had been class 
action settlements that occurred where the responding institution had later 
learned that it had not received notice of the settlement. Eighteen of the 
respondents claimed there were no such instances, one institution stated it had 
 
48. Because we did multiple mailings with overlapping mailing lists, some institutions 
received more than one questionnaire. In two cases, we received more than one reply from 
the same institution, undoubtedly because of the repeat mailings. We thank those diligent 
funds for taking the time to reply twice to our questionnaire, but felt we had to exclude their 
second replies from our sample. 
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learned of one such matter,49 and three fund representatives said that they “[d]o 
not know.” Only one respondent said that because of delays with the mail, they 
had received some notices too late to ask their custodian to file claims.50 
The second section of the questionnaire was designed to determine which 
funds used custodian banks to file their claims and which had internal staff that 
handled these duties. Of the twenty public pension funds that responded, 
seventeen delegated these duties to their custodian bank, one employed a 
private law firm to file its claims, and the remaining two funds had internal 
processes for claims filing.51 
Of the seventeen public pension funds that employ a custodian bank to file 
their claims, we found that fourteen of those funds,52 and both private pension 
funds, have little involvement in the process other than receiving a report from 
the custodian, usually once a month, about pending claims and monies received 
 
49. It stated that, as a result, it had instituted new monitoring procedures to insure that 
this failure would not occur again. 
50. We cannot draw strong conclusions from these responses for several reasons, 
although we note that the responses seem to conflict with our earlier empirical results. First, 
the investors responding to our questionnaire are self-selected and likely to be those who 
have better practices in the area. Thus, they may well be abnormal in terms of their approach 
to filing claims. Second, given the widespread distribution and press coverage of our earlier 
findings, those institutional investors that did not file claims are likely to have learned that 
they have legal duties to do so. This awareness may have quickly led those funds to make 
changes in the way they handled claims filing. These changes could account for why we see 
a relatively high rate of nonfiling in the earlier time period covered by our claims 
administrator data and a very low rate of self-reported failures found in the later survey 
response period. Third, it is possible that the different fund employees responding to our 
survey are unaware of any failures to file claims, or receive notice, especially if their 
employer delegates such functions to its custodian bank and does not monitor that bank’s 
activities. Finally, it is possible that the survey respondents were worried about potential 
legal liability for failing to file claims and, therefore, chose not to report any such failures. 
We view this possibility as unlikely given the confidential and anonymous nature of the 
responses. Nonetheless, we address the liability standards for such failures below and find 
that the likelihood of such liability would be low in most instances. 
51. Both private pension funds employed their trustee bank to act as their custodian, 
and it filed all of their claims for them. The bank respondent acted as its own claims filing 
agent, apparently handling both its clients’ filing duties and those for its own accounts. The 
two public pension funds that handled all of their claims internally had elaborate written 
protocols on how to manage the process. Each assigned specific employees to receive and 
process settlement notices, to interface with their custodian banks to obtain the information 
that they needed to file claims, and to use computer tracking systems for all pending 
settlements. Finally, the remaining fund had contracted with a private law firm to coordinate 
filing claims with its custodian banks and to monitor all of its recoveries from class action 
settlements. This law firm gave the fund’s personnel access to its settlement tracking system 
to permit the fund to monitor its recoveries. 
52. The remaining three funds that used custodians had active internal monitoring 
systems for tracking settlement notices, claims made, and monies recovered from each 
settlement. Each of these funds had specific personnel assigned to these tasks. The costs 
associated with these activities were allocated as general administrative or investment 
expenses of the fund, or considered part of the regular duties of the employees involved. 
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from settlements.53 The custodian banks filed all of their client funds’ claims as 
part of a larger set of services and thus did not charge a separate fee.54 These 
funds, therefore, reported no costs associated with claims filing. 
Section three of the questionnaire gathered information on a wide variety 
of practices at the funds. First, we returned to the question of whether the 
respondents filed all claims in class action settlements, and if not, what factors 
led them to choose to file claims. Every pension fund respondent but one (we 
discuss the bank respondent separately below) stated that they filed all claims, 
with a few adding the qualifier that they excluded cases in which they were 
ineligible or had opted out of the class.55 The one remaining pension fund 
stated that their custodian bank had full discretion to file claims, although they 
were expected to do so in every case in which the fund had suffered a loss. 
Subject to all of the same qualifications we pointed out above with respect to 
this question in our first survey, we note that these replies are apparently 
inconsistent with the data reported in Part II. We also note that the unqualified 
responses we received, if accepted at face value, mean that funds do not take 
into account the cost of filing in deciding whether to make claims. This fact 
could lead to inefficient behavior where the cost of filing the claim exceeds the 
potential recovery. 
This possibility raises a question about those funds that delegate all claims 
filing duties to their custodian banks.56 We cannot be sure how the banks treat 
the instruction to file all claims. Might it be that custodians only file cost-
justified claims, ignoring the instruction to file all claims? Of more concern is 
that if the custodian receives a fixed fee for its services but pays all of the costs 
 
53. Two of these public funds stated that they had recently retained an independent 
claims filing service that monitored their custodians’ claims filing activities. 
54. One respondent noted that it was in the process of negotiating a new agreement 
with its custodian bank and that under the terms of that agreement, the custodian would 
charge a separate fee for claims filing services. 
55. Interestingly, our one bank respondent did not adopt such a blanket approach to 
claims filing. Rather, it cited three factors—size of estimated recovery, size of loss suffered, 
and size of overall settlement—as the most important considerations behind its decision 
about whether to file a claim. It also noted that the costs involved in filing a claim could be 
substantial, including technology-storage and retrieval costs, the costs of compiling data, 
staff time and any overtime charges when deadlines needed to be met, and the direct costs 
for supplies, postage, and shipping. Although this respondent was not (to our knowledge) the 
custodian bank for any of our other respondents, it does suggest that the custodians are more 
conscious of the cost-benefit balance involved in claims filing. 
56. We asked our respondents if they believed that institutional investors, or their 
custodian banks, had a fiduciary duty to file claims in securities class actions and, if so, what 
the source of that duty was. The respondents that answered this question uniformly stated 
“yes.” Some of the replies focused on the duties of the custodian bank to file claims, which 
the respondents believed arose out of fiduciary and/or contractual duties. The remaining 
answers discussed the institution’s duty to file claims. Here, the respondents consistently 
pointed to trust principles, either under common law, state law, or ERISA, as the source of a 
duty to file claims. We interpret these replies as reflecting a strong awareness on behalf of 
these institutions of their obligations to file claims. 
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of filing claims without reimbursement from the fund, as seems to be the norm 
with most respondents, then the bank’s financial interests would seem to be to 
do as little claims filing as possible. This result could lead to potential conflicts 
with their client funds’ interests. This problem could remain undetected if the 
client fund does little or no monitoring of the claims filed on its behalf. 
Minimal fund monitoring does seem to have been the norm amongst our 
respondents, although we note that hiring independent third-party monitors, or 
having an active internal monitoring system at the fund, would address this 
issue. 
We then asked what our respondents felt was the most difficult aspect of 
filing claims in securities class actions. Those funds that had delegated claims 
filing to their custodian bank without much monitoring almost uniformly 
reported that there was nothing difficult about the process. The other responses 
identified three types of problems: learning about settlements and monitoring 
claims, gathering and compiling the information necessary to perfect claims, 
and accounting for the payments when they are received. 
Those respondents who noted the difficulty in learning about settlements 
suggested the creation of a central clearinghouse, or website, for information 
about all securities fraud class action settlements.57 This step would aid 
institutions in determining whether they have claims in different cases. We note 
that the independent claims filing monitoring services with which we are 
familiar have created proprietary databases which they use for this purpose. 
The funds that mentioned the second problem, gathering and compiling 
information for claims filing, recommended that filing requirements be 
simplified and automated using standardized forms. The one bank respondent 
also made similar proposals. In addition, one respondent suggested that claims 
administrators should accept electronic data from known institutional investors 
with digital signatures. 
The final problem, accounting for the payments received, was one that we 
had inquired about in a separate question in the survey. Ideally, we would want 
to have any recovery that the fund makes credited to the accounts of those 
persons that held interests in the fund at the time of the loss suffered in 
proportion to their share of those losses. Administratively, however, this would 
require the pension funds to engage in some complex calculations about who 
the particular beneficiaries were at that point in time and what percentage of the 
 
57. Respondents stated that the current claims notification system is not reliable. Given 
the many twists and turns involved in getting notices of settlement from the company, or 
claims administrator, to the beneficial owners, it seems inevitable that many notices will go 
astray. One simple solution to the problem would be to require all beneficial owners to 
provide issuers with current address information. This requirement would permit the 
company to quickly generate a mailing list of all of its shareholders for use in distributing 
settlement notices. An alternative but less satisfactory response to this problem would be for 
courts to require all claims administrators to post settlement notices on a centralized website 
or information clearinghouse. 
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recovery they were entitled to receive and then to allocate what are likely to be 
very small amounts of money to each of them, including those who have left 
the fund. Given the difficulty of this exercise, we expected that funds would 
adopt some form of simplified allocation system to determine where to place 
these funds. We were not disappointed in our speculation. 
What we learned from the questionnaires was that our respondents had 
come up with two basic allocation techniques for funds recovered in these 
settlements. Some funds deposited the monies recovered into the portfolio that 
had suffered the loss, unless that portfolio had been terminated (usually because 
the money manager was terminated), in which case, the money was deposited 
into their general accounts for benefit payments. The second common method 
was to put the monies directly into the fund’s general account for the benefit of 
all beneficiaries.58 No respondents said that they allocated monies directly to 
member accounts.59 Although it is hard to see a better practical solution to this 
problem, it does raise a concern about whether securities fraud class action 
settlements are indeed compensating those who were injured by the fraud. 
We asked if the respondents had any additional information that they 
wanted to provide us. Two funds emphasized the value of the independent 
claims monitoring services that have emerged in the past few years. We agree 
that these services have been a very positive development that should help 
institutional investors monitor their custodian banks’ activities. These services 
can also file claims on behalf of the institutions. If custodian banks continue to 
move toward charging a separate fee for claims filing services, institutions may 
want to look at the cost-effectiveness of the different services. 
Finally, one respondent explained to us that most investment staff view 
claims filing as unworthy of much attention for two reasons. First, they 
consider their time better spent investing money rather than trying to recover 
funds. Second, they view securities litigation as simply taking money from one 
pocket (as owners) and putting it into another pocket (as victims) while paying 
a percentage of it to the lawyers. Although we can certainly understand why 
investment managers may feel this way, our response would be that they should 
nevertheless hire a claims filing service to handle their claims because doing so 
maximizes the value of their beneficiaries’ investment. 
V. LIABILITY RULES 
Taken as a whole, our results suggest a widespread failure to file claims in 
securities fraud class actions, although our survey respondents claim otherwise. 
As we noted,60 we suspect that this apparent conflict arises from a process of 
 
58. For the defined benefit plans, this resulted in a credit to the employers’ accounts. 
59. One respondent also assured us that the recovered monies did not get put into a 
bonus pool for fund employees. 
60. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
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self-selection among the potential respondents to the survey. In this regard, we 
note that the respondents to the survey represent a small minority of the 
universe of institutional investors, or even of the group to whom we distributed 
copies of our survey. An institution that does file claims is more likely to be 
willing to complete our survey because they (and their legal counsel) are not 
afraid of creating potential liabilities to their beneficiaries. Institutions that do 
not file claims, on the other hand, could well decide to decline to complete the 
survey and avoid self-reporting their potential breaches of fiduciary duties. 
Moreover, a prudent advisor to an institutional investor might advise a 
respondent against reporting widespread failures to file claims because of 
concerns about the confidentiality of replies if subsequent litigation did 
develop.61 For that reason, our data set does not permit us to undertake a full-
scale institution-by-institution review of all potential securities fraud class 
action claims that would be needed to conclusively resolve the conflict between 
these two sets of data. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Part, we will 
assume that at least some institutions have failed to file claims in securities 
fraud class action settlements at some point in the past. If this assumption is 
true, what are the legal implications for these derelict funds? 
The first important issue is determining the appropriate legal standard to 
apply in this situation. As we discussed in our earlier work,62 we believe that 
institutional investors have a legal duty to file claims in securities fraud class 
action settlements. There is amazing uniformity about the fiduciary obligations 
of institutional investors to their investors in this area: these institutions cannot 
abandon without reason a claim to recover funds in a securities fraud class 
action settlement.63 Although an institution could, consistent with its fiduciary 
obligation to maximize the value of its beneficiaries’ assets, decide not to file a 
claim on the basis of comparing the costs to submit the claim with the expected 
award from the settlement, we would generally expect this to be a one-sided 
calculation in favor of filing for any actively trading institution. Moreover, as 
we noted in Part IV above, our survey respondents appear to be well aware of 
this duty. Furthermore, independent third-party claims filing services now 
provide these services in exchange for a percentage of the amounts recovered, 
making it difficult for institutions to continue to claim that they do not file 
claims because they are devoting their internal resources to higher-valued uses. 
 
61. Fears of potential litigation have not been unfounded, as scores of lawsuits have 
been filed against mutual funds charging a failure to file such claims. Jonathan D. Glater, 
Suits Contend Mutual Funds Fail To Collect in Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at 
C1. To date, some courts hearing these cases have been reluctant to imply a private right of 
action for investors to enforce section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. See 
Mutchka v. Harris, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1025-26 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Jacobs v. Bremner, 378 
F. Supp. 2d 861, 863-66 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
62. Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 860-67. 
63. Id. 
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A. Institutional Investors 
The asserted cause of action that might be brought against the institutional 
investors’ trustees would be that by failing to cause their fund to file all cost-
justified claims in securities fraud class action settlements, they have breached 
their duty of care to be active monitors of their funds’ performance. If this were 
not just the complaint but also the governing standard, what, if anything, do the 
trustees need to do to satisfy their fiduciary duties to file claims? 
The Delaware Chancery Court has previously addressed a similar type of 
problem in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation.64 In 
approving a derivative lawsuit settlement, then-Chancellor Allen addressed the 
plaintiff shareholders’ claim that the board had breached its duty of care by 
failing to monitor its operations for potential violations of federal law. The 
Chancellor rejected the defendant’s claim that a board had no duty to monitor 
whether the corporation was operating within the boundaries of the law to 
accomplish its purposes. Instead, he found that the directors had a duty to make 
“a good faith judgment that the corporation’s information and reporting system 
is in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate 
information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary 
operations” so that the board can satisfy its duty of care.65 If the directors failed 
to attempt in good faith to insure that the firm had an adequate information and 
reporting system, the Chancellor stated that this failure could render them 
“liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.”66 
Moreover, if the directors put a system in place and subsequently learned that it 
was inadequate, they would have a duty to make a good faith determination 
about how best to correct the system’s failure. It appears to us that swept within 
the monitoring obligations of trustees and directors of financial institutions lies 
an obligation to have reliable systems in place to collect for their funds any 
sums to which they are entitled (provided, of course, that the expected benefits 
justify the costs of presenting a claim). 
Trustees at funds without claims filing systems, or with systems suffering 
from systematic failures, who do not act to address their problems face a threat 
of potential liability for the amount of money that they left on the table. We 
believe that in order to satisfy their oversight responsibilities, the trustees of 
institutional investors must, in good faith, insure that their fund has an adequate 
system in place to identify and process the funds’ claims. Furthermore, they 
should establish a monitoring mechanism to insure that this system is adequate, 
and if they learn it is inadequate, they must take measures to fix the problems. 
This standard is not onerous.67 For those institutions that have in good faith 
 
64. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
65. Id. at 970. 
66. Id. 
67. As Chancellor Allen wrote in Caremark, 
In order to show that the Caremark directors breached their duty of care[,] . . . plaintiffs 
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already contracted for their claims filing duties to be carried out by their 
custodian banks, it would appear they have put in place a reasonably designed 
system. However, any system requires periodic review, so we further suggest 
that there is a need to engage in routine monitoring activities to insure that the 
custodian is doing its job.68 Our survey responses tell us that the norm in this 
situation is for the custodian to send the fund a periodic statement about 
recoveries without much additional monitoring by the fund. From a best 
practices perspective, we would urge the funds using custodian banks in this 
manner to do more to monitor them, either through periodic audits or by hiring 
an independent third-party claims monitor. However, unless a fund was aware 
that its custodian was performing its claims filing duties badly and the fund’s 
trustees consciously decided to do nothing about it, the current practice would 
likely be sufficient to protect fund trustees from liability. A fund that relies on 
custodians to file its claims but has employees that actively monitor its 
custodian’s activities should also face little legal liability risk, so long as the 
trustees respond actively and in good faith if evidence emerges that the claims 
process is malfunctioning. 
Our analysis is similar for those funds that handle all of their own claims 
filing internally, relying solely on custodians or others to provide them with the 
transaction data necessary to perfect the claim. If the fund’s trustees have acted 
in good faith in setting up the internal process and there is no evidence that the 
system is failing, then they should be protected from liability. For these funds, 
best practices should include the creation of written protocols that describe the 
steps in their process and that set forth clear lines of responsibility for each of 
the various steps that must take place to insure claims are filed on a timely 
basis. For funds using internal processes, having periodic outside audits, or 
ongoing monitoring, of their systems may be particularly important to make 
sure that they work effectively. 
One final point concerns the potential liability of trustees that choose not to 
file claims in cases where they have potential conflicts of interest, such as 
mutual funds that fail to file claims because they do not want to antagonize 
potential clients for their services. Here, we see the possibility that the trustees 
will have breached their duty of loyalty by placing their own financial interests 
ahead of those of their beneficiaries.69 This legal standard is much more strict 
 
would have to show either (1) that the directors knew or (2) should have known that 
violations of the law were occurring and, in either event, (3) that the directors took no steps 
in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy that situation, and (4) that such failure proximately 
resulted in the losses complained of . . . . 
Id. at 971. 
68. The custodian bank can further delegate these duties to a subagent so long as it is 
“usual in managing a client’s investments and is not unreasonable or inconsistent with the 
express terms of the customer service agreement.” JOHN J. QUARRELL, THE LAW OF PENSION 
FUND INVESTMENT 29 (1990). 
69. See In re Honeywell Int’l ERISA Litig., No. 03-1214, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21585, at *44-45 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2004) (upholding, against motion to dismiss, allegations 
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than the Caremark test, which serves to reinforce the need for institutions to 
create adequate claims filing systems. 
B. Custodians 
Custodial liability for failure to file claims could arise from one of two 
sources: first, contractual duties arising from any agreement between the 
investor and the custodian and, second, the custodian’s general fiduciary duty 
to its clients. As to the former, if the parties’ contract specifies that the 
custodian is responsible for handling any aspect of the claims filing process and 
the custodian fails to perform those services with reasonable care and diligence 
in accordance with the contract, then it could be held liable under general 
contract law.70 It is likely that the contractual requirements, either explicitly or 
implicitly, would include as well the professional obligation that the agents 
must exercise “the degree of care that is expected of the reasonable, average 
member of the profession . . . .”71 
The source of the custodian’s fiduciary duty is the agency relationship 
between it and the client fund. The custodian holds legal title to the securities 
that its customer, the institutional investor, owns beneficially and must manage 
this property for the benefit of the institutional investor. This control over the 
property of another creates fiduciary obligations under both the duty of care 
and duty of loyalty in performing its duties. In regards to the claims filing 
process, we are primarily concerned with the duty of care prong of its fiduciary 
obligations.72 
Some custodians will only hold title for the securities of their customers, 
without having any active involvement in the claims filing process. Such 
custodians need only concern themselves with insuring that their customers 
receive notice of class action settlements.73 This obligation would certainly 
 
that plan fiduciaries breached their duty of loyalty to their beneficiaries by investing in firm 
stock where their compensation partially depended on inflating the firm’s stock price); In re 
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003) 
(similar). 
70. QUARRELL, supra note 68, at 27-28 (“[T]he degree of care and skill which the law 
of contract demands of an agent is similar to the normal duty of care in negligence.”). 
71. Id. at 28. 
72. The duty of care in this instance could overlap with that imposed by contract. 
73. With respect to the gathering of notices, we can envision three situations in which 
a custodian might incur liability. The first would arise if the custodian did not receive notice 
about the settlement directly from the class agent but should have known about the 
settlement because a notice was published in the financial press, yet failed to send notice of 
the settlement to the beneficial owners of the securities. Second, the custodian may have 
received the notice of settlement or otherwise become aware of the settlement but never 
acted to send this notice along to its eligible customers. Finally, a custodian could receive 
notice of the settlement and try to mail such notice to its eligible customers but be unable to 
do so because it lacks address information for former customers who have changed their 
addresses. 
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include forwarding any notice received from the claims administrator. Absent a 
contractual undertaking to do so, it is not likely that such a custodian’s 
obligation should be expanded to an affirmative obligation of actively 
reviewing publications such as The Wall Street Journal for notices of 
settlements. However, custodian banks may take on the additional function of 
screening publications for possible settlements involving their clients, filing 
claims, or providing adequate information to the party that files the claims on 
behalf of the institutional investor.74 In such a case, they would also assume 
fiduciary obligations with respect to their performance of these tasks.  
Not addressed in the contract are the obligations that flow from the advisor 
or the custodian to the fund after the fund has severed its relationship with that 
advisor or custodian. From our discussions with industry participants, we are 
aware that many funds regularly change their custodian or other advisor 
relationships as part of their obligations to monitor the costs and performance 
of their vendors. As seen earlier, the median length of time from the beginning 
of a class action period to publication of a settlement notice exceeds three 
years. During this period, it is natural to expect that the advisor or custodian 
responsible for the fund’s securities at the time the fraud giving rise to a claim 
arose may not be the same advisor or custodian at the time notice of a 
settlement is published. Whether the subsequent agent files a claim on behalf of 
the fund rests initially upon whether it has received the trading records during 
the tenure of an earlier advisor or custodian.  
At the same time, we can question the incentives for the former advisor or 
custodian to diligently monitor and pursue possible claims on behalf of its 
former clients. As between the fund and its former advisor or custodian, it 
would appear the obligation is on the part of the fund to assure itself that its 
trading records and other support documents are transferred to it or to the new 
advisor or custodian so that reasonable monitoring for future settlements can 
occur. Correlatively, it does not appear that this burden would continue on the 
part of the former advisor or custodian in the absence of an explicit 
understanding that the former, now terminated, advisor or custodian would 
continue to monitor publications for possible settlement notices. We strongly 
suspect that there is substantial breakdown on the part of funds to address 
issues that arise when a fund changes its advisors or agents. 
A pension fund that brought an action for breach of contract or fiduciary 
duties would need to establish that the failure to file constituted the proximate 
 
74. Those custodians that also handle their clients’ claims filing duties face an 
additional set of potential liabilities if they are negligent in performing their duties. 
Assuming that the custodian has received timely notice and timely instructions from its 
client to file a claim in the settlement, it needs to ensure that it generates the appropriate 
documentation of trading activities within the class period, completes the paperwork 
associated with filing the claim, and returns the claim materials to the settlement 
administrator by the filing deadline. A negligent failure to perform any of these functions 
could lead to custodian liability for breach of contract and/or breach of fiduciary duties. 
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cause of a lost recovery. It would also need to come up with an estimate of the 
lost recovery, which would likely be far less than the amount of the full damage 
claim that was not filed.75 However, assuming these elements could be 
established, the custodian’s damages for breach of this duty could be 
determined by the amount of the lost recovery.76 
VI. EASY STEPS TO ENSURE THAT INSTITUTIONS RECEIVE THEIR FAIR SHARE 
Our survey revealed several ways in which the present system needs to be 
modified so as to be both more efficient and reliable in the way notice of claims 
is imparted. We considered each of these issues and offer the following 
recommendations. 
A. Establish a Centralized Information Clearinghouse 
As described above, claims administrators presently pursue a variety of 
approaches to impart notice, but none of the strategies we examined entails 
publishing notice of settlements in a common location. For example, some 
claims administrators publish notice in the national press but not always in the 
same newspaper. Notice of settlements is also observed by prospective 
claimants in Class Action Alert. However, our perusal of that publication 
suggests that not all settlements appear therein. Our survey results support the 
view that institutions would benefit from greater certainty regarding where they 
could access information that would enable them to determine whether they are 
the beneficiaries of a settlement. Therefore, our first recommendation is that all 
settlement notices, claim forms, and information on how to file claims should 
be available to anyone through a centralized website. 
Accomplishing this objective need not be difficult or expensive. Securities 
fraud class action settlements must be approved by federal courts. It would 
seem a simple matter for courts to condition their approval upon the settlement 
administrator posting, on a centralized website, all of this information. Each 
settlement could be assessed a modest fee to pay for the creation and 
maintenance of such a website. The website could be operated by a court, 
private company, or educational institution. It would also be possible to link to 
that website an automatic forwarding of new postings to those who wish to 
 
75. In our earlier paper, we found that actual recoveries were only about one-third of 
provable losses in the small sample of cases where we had sufficient data to make these 
calculations. Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 877 tbl.3. 
76. A custodian bank could seek to limit its potential liability on claims of this type by 
inserting an appropriate clause into its contract with its clients. An interesting question 
would then arise concerning whether such a limitation would also apply to damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 
49 (Del. 1994) (rejecting an argument that a board of directors could limit its fiduciary 
obligations by contract). 
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subscribe to the service so that institutions could automatically receive notice 
of new settlements. 
The creation of this type of information clearinghouse would greatly 
increase the availability of information about settlements for institutional 
investors, custodians, and individual investors. Given the numerous anecdotes 
we heard regarding the difficulties of insuring that notice reaches all of the 
many potential filing parties, it seems like a low-cost solution to what many 
participants claim is a major problem. 
B. Standardize Trading Documentation and Claims Forms 
A second recurrent complaint by our survey participants was that each 
settlement utilized different claims forms, required different forms of proof that 
the institution was a class member, and sought different documentation of the 
amount of investors’ claims. Each of these problems could be easily addressed 
by the creation of a set of standard claims forms that embody a uniform set of 
requirements for proof of class membership and size of claim. Such 
standardized forms could be made available on the centralized information 
website. Creating the forms would be a relatively trivial matter for the main 
participants in the process once the federal courts mandated their adoption. 
There should be no difficulty in forms being so standardized. Processing 
claims arising in connection with securities regulation settlements involves the 
same issues case after case. The dominant and recurring issues are the dates of 
trading by the claimant and proof to support the underlying trading. 
Standardizing the information and format to follow when filing claims would 
reduce the custodians’ and investors’ costs without creating any additional 
work for settlement administrators. If an unusual settlement arose, for which 
the existing forms would not be appropriate, the settlement administrator could 
ask the court for permission to use an individually tailored form, but we think 
that this would be a rare occurrence. 
C. Improve Institutional Monitoring of Claims Filing 
The majority of our survey respondents did very little monitoring of their 
custodians or advisors to determine if they were forwarding settlement notices 
and, for those contracting out claims filing services, filing claims. All 
institutions should seriously reevaluate their systems, and, based on our 
experience, we believe most institutions should consider adopting more 
aggressive monitoring systems to insure that they are receiving their share of 
the available settlement money. A step toward correcting this oversight would 
be an annual review by the institution’s trustees of the past year’s claims. This 
step would not only reinforce the trustees’ obligations to monitor this activity 
but surely would also set in place internal procedures to complement the 
heightened scrutiny of this aspect of the institution’s activities. 
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The creation of a centralized information source on securities class action 
settlements, as suggested earlier, would make this monitoring much easier 
because it would permit an institution to assign a staff member to conduct a 
periodic search of the website for cases involving the investor’s portfolio 
companies. Alternatively, some institutions may hire an independent third-party 
claims service to perform this monitoring function for them. In any case, it is of 
the utmost importance that institutions develop procedures to assure that 
records of trading are passed on to successive advisors or custodians or, better 
yet, to the institution itself. As discussed earlier, one of the great problems 
confronting institutions in presenting their claims may be the substantial 
passage of time that transpires between when the trade giving rise to the claim 
occurred and when notice of a settlement is imparted. During this interval— 
which, as seen earlier, is often measured in years—custodians or advisors are 
likely to have changed. It is difficult for us to believe that an ex-advisor or ex-
custodian has the same commitment to its former client as it has to its current 
clients. Thus, if an institution assures itself that the relevant trading records are 
forwarded to it whenever it has terminated either the custodian or advisor, the 
institution could thereby responsibly monitor settlement notices for possible 
claims that it could submit. 
D. Strengthen Institutions’ 13F Filing Requirements 
We believe the core factor explaining institutions’ poor claims record is 
that, in most instances, notice of a settlement is not directly imparted to the 
institutions. Our survey results reflect a heavy dependence by institutions on 
publication of notice or on their advisors or custodians to learn of a settlement. 
As seen earlier, notice is not imparted directly to the institutions because they, 
like their retail customer counterparts, hold shares in street names. Moreover, 
institutions are more likely to rely on discretionary trading by their advisors, 
which is another reason for shares being recorded in another’s name. As a 
result, several layers of records must be penetrated if the notice is to reach the 
ultimate beneficiary of a settlement. 
One sweeping response to this problem would be to require each issuer to 
maintain reliable records of their beneficial owners. This requirement would 
essentially mandate a Non-Objecting Beneficial Ownership (NOBO) list for all 
public companies. Such a regulatory response would have the collateral effect 
of facilitating stockholder communications among themselves, not to mention 
proxy contests, because such a list could be accessed by any stockholder of the 
company. However, this development might not be well received by the 
company’s management because under the all-important Delaware corporate 
law, stockholders are not entitled to the NOBO list unless the company 
currently has that list in its possession, and this provision is often invoked in 
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the heat of a takeover battle.77 Moreover, many institutions value anonymity 
regarding their holdings and trading and would oppose changes that make such 
information public. 
A much less intrusive change is simply to tweak the current Form 13F 
filing methodology so that it is consistent with the objectives Congress sought 
to achieve in 1968 when Section 13(f) reporting requirements were 
mandated.78 The section’s purpose was, among other things, “to facilitate the 
collection and public dissemination of information concerning the holding of 
and transactions in securities by institutional investment managers.”79 
Form 13F filings currently fail to fulfill this congressional mandate. One 
fundamental concern is the overall level of compliance with Section 13(f)’s 
disclosure requirements. Our review of the LexisNexis database reveals no 
SEC enforcement action for noncompliance with Section 13(f) in the 
legislation’s thirty-six-year history. Either there is remarkable compliance with 
the provision or a similar level of inattention to this provision by the SEC. The 
former is necessary if Form 13F is to be the linchpin for improved notice of 
securities class action settlements. Even if there is a solid record of timely and 
accurate filings of Form 13F, the SEC needs to improve the ability of third 
parties to access the information collected through Form 13F. 
Currently, the SEC licenses to Spectrum the right to publish in electronic 
and paper format information the SEC gains through Form 13F. There are two 
major problems with the current Spectrum database. First, the software system 
used by Spectrum does not allow users to search the database using the twin 
parameters of a time period and a specific issuer. For example, in undertaking 
our own efforts to access Form 13F filings, after discussions with Spectrum’s 
technical staff, we had to abandon any effort to assemble the data we needed 
electronically. Instead, we had to undertake extremely time-consuming hand 
reviews of printed copies of Spectrum data. This software glitch renders the 
Form 13F filings impractical as a source that claims administrators could use 
for imparting notice. 
We therefore suggest that the SEC reevaluate its own capacity to make this 
information available through its EDGAR database and to incorporate into that 
electronic database search protocols for Section 13(f) filings that would better 
 
77. See Shamrock Assocs. v. Tex. Am. Energy Corp., 517 A.2d 658, 661 (Del. Ch. 
1986). Moreover, the stockholders cannot compel the list to be prepared and obtained. 
Compare RB Assocs. of N.J., L.P. v. Gillette Co., No. CIV.A.88-9711, 1988 WL 27731, at 
*7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1988) (holding there was no obligation of management to obtain 
NOBO list upon request of stockholder), with Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 
1991) (interpreting New York statute to require company to compile NOBO list). 
78. Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act was added in 1975. Pub. L. No. 94-
29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). The addition was partly a response to the concern caused by the 
dramatic increase of the amount of securities held and traded by institutional investment 
managers during the middle and late 1960s. S. REP. NO. 94-75 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 256-66. 
79. Pub. L. No. 94-29, pmbl., 89 Stat. 97 (1975). 
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accommodate the likely informational needs of claims administrators and 
others. Moreover, the SEC should assume responsibility for making available 
the Form 13F information rather than requiring users of that information to 
incur substantial subscription fees to access that database. Even if the SEC 
believes it most appropriate to license this information to a third-party vendor, 
it should at least insist that the licensed vendor modify its electronic operating 
system so as to permit searches that claims administrators are likely to make 
using that database. 
A second problem with the information collected on Form 13F is that it 
does not identify who is the beneficial owner of the reported shares. The 
obligation imposed by Section 13(f) extends to the entity that invests as well as 
its advisor. Frequently, Form 13F is filed by the institution’s advisor, who lists 
the shares held by it for all its clients. Thus, Form 13F does not presently lead a 
third-party user of that data, who beneficially owns the shares, to be reported 
on Form 13F. It may well be that the beneficial owner wishes anonymity. 
Indeed, the SEC rules embrace a process for certain information to be filed 
confidentially through Form 13F.80 We believe that with only modest effort on 
the part of the SEC, it should be possible to require the beneficial owner of 
shares being reported on an advisor’s filings to be identified confidentially. The 
next shoe to drop in this procedure is, consistent with the institution’s likely 
concern for confidentiality, for the SEC to develop an electronic system 
whereby notices can be forwarded from the claims administrator, through the 
SEC, to the institution that beneficially owns the holdings reported by its 
advisor’s Form 13F filing. Such a development would ensure that notice is 
directly imparted to the beneficial owner, which would allow for better 
monitoring of the advisor’s discharge of its obligations to present claims. 
E. Improve Claims Filing Systems  
At present, a wide variety of claims filing systems are being employed by 
institutional investors—some of which are very effective, while others are quite 
haphazard. A more standardized and systematic approach needs to be put in 
place. Government regulators can play an important role in bringing about this 
change. Almost all institutional investors are subject to some type of regulation 
by the federal government. The SEC, U.S. Department of Labor, and Federal 
Comptroller of the Currency could use their regulatory powers to facilitate 
better monitoring by establishing clear guidelines concerning claims filing 
 
80. Institutional investment managers may request confidential treatment of 
information in filings on Form 13F on the basis, among others, that the information would 
reveal an investment manager’s ongoing program of acquisition or disposition. Shareholder 
Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment 
Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8393, 82 S.E.C. Docket 943 n.85 (Feb. 27, 2004); 
see also Form 13F, Report of Institutional Investment Manager Pursuant to Section 13(f) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 249.325 (2005). 
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practices and duties for the fiduciaries under their respective regulatory 
jurisdictions. Alternatively, a law-reform organization could develop such a set 
of guidelines, borrowing from some of the more successful systems that are 
currently in place. Finally, institutions themselves could copy other well-
performing systems or draw on their own experience in processing proxy 
information and casting their votes as a potential model for how they can create 
a better claims filing system. 
VII. THE SOCIAL WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR DATA AND SURVEY 
A. The Mismatch of Injury and Recovery 
Our survey and data raise several points that have important policy 
implications. The first arises out of the manner in which institutions distribute 
recoveries from securities fraud class action settlements. As discussed earlier, 
all of the institutions that responded to our survey allocated any settlement 
funds they received either to the particular portfolio that held the affected 
securities or placed their recovery into a general fund. To be sure, from a 
practical standpoint, it is hard to see what else they could do. Nevertheless, 
regardless of which of these two options are pursued, the end result is the same: 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the recovered settlement are unlikely to be (except 
in the case of endowments) the same in identity or proportion as those who 
actually suffered the loss. 
The fact that class action recoveries by institutions are not allocated to the 
individual fund beneficiaries connects with a larger question: Are class actions 
capable of serving a compensatory function? For example, if an alleged fraud 
occurs seven years prior to a settlement, which is not uncommon, many if not 
all of the institutions receiving payments from the settlement will have 
experienced significant turnover in their beneficiaries during that time period. 
Many investors who had money invested in the fund, or who were employed at 
the company or governmental entity for which the fund invests, may well have 
withdrawn their money by the time of settlement. These injured beneficiaries 
(and in the case of mutual funds, investor-beneficiaries) will not share in the 
benefit from these payments; instead, the payments are a windfall for the other 
fund beneficiaries.81 In short, there is a mismatch between those investors who 
suffered losses and those who benefit from the recovery. 
Even larger windfalls are raised, and a growing awareness of the 
 
81. One commentator on this Article pointed out that if an institutional investor 
regularly files claims, there is likely to be a consistent flow of recoveries that will accrue to 
beneficiaries of the fund. Thus, on average, all beneficiaries will receive some level of 
compensation for their losses. However, there will still be a mismatch between the specific 
settlement payments and the specific beneficiaries who were originally harmed. We believe 
this mismatch leaves open the question of the compensatory function being played by these 
cases. 
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noncompensatory feature of securities class action settlements is posed, by our 
finding that approximately seventy percent of the institutions with provable 
losses fail to present their claims. Against such a record, it is difficult to 
envision the securities class action as serving a compensatory purpose, except 
for the diligent minority. When this observation is coupled with evidence that 
the settlement amount in any class action represents a very small part of the 
losses suffered by the class members, it is even more difficult to attribute a 
compensatory mission to the securities class action. Indeed, there is a perverse 
irony in the institutions’ dismal record in presenting their claims. By letting 
billions slip through their fingers, institutions essentially enhance the amounts 
recovered by those investors who present their claims. That is, their slumbering 
actually enhances the compensatory quality of securities class actions for those 
who do file claims. 
Would settlement amounts be greater if the institutions more frequently 
presented their claims? We can only speculate. Securities class actions are a 
zero-sum game. In any given case, whether more or fewer claimants appear 
does not affect the size of the settlement. And, per our experience, the 
settlement amount is fixed and lies well below the provable losses suffered by 
the class.82 To be sure, the settlement is reached in the shadow of the law and 
with some sensitivity to the losses suffered by the class. An awareness that 
more claimants than customary will appear, perhaps because of wide adoption 
of the reforms counseled above, could change the settlement negotiations in 
that larger settlements would emerge to appease the claimants. 
A dramatic shift upwards in the number of claimants in settled suits may 
well cause some drift upward in settlement amounts. However, we suspect that 
settlements are fixed, even in the face of unquestioned skulduggery and huge 
provable losses, by the amount of available insurance or cash from the issuer. 
One empirical observation consistent with our belief that settlements are 
bounded by considerations far more compelling than the losses suffered by the 
class is the sheer magnitude of the provable losses in so many settled securities 
class actions. Our ongoing studies, as well as those by others, consistently 
report that most settlements recover substantially less than even ten cents on 
each dollar of provable losses suffered by the class. This finding exists even 
though settlements, in absolute amounts, are well above the level that would 
lead one to believe that they are baseless actions in which defendants are 
content to settle for small sums that are below their costs to aggressively defend 
themselves. That is, provable losses are immense even in cases where the 
settlements involve sums in excess of $30 million. These data are consistent 
with our belief that most settlements are bounded by insurance and a healthy 
respect for the fact that any significant contribution to the settlement in excess 
of available insurance as a practical matter can only be from the corporation 
itself. As developed below, the latter cannot be seen as a wholly positive 
 
82. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 3, at 877-78. 
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development for the members of the class. 
A second moderating factor is the low likelihood that claimants may object 
to the settlement due to the low recovery (an even lower per share recovery if 
institutions slumber less) because of the friction that objectors face. For 
example, few settlements are rejected due to the issues raised by objectors; 
those who do object have to bear their own cost to appear, and unless they seek 
to intervene before the trial court, they lack standing to appeal approval of the 
settlement.83 
We are very skeptical that class actions can be seen as purely or 
substantially compensatory. Frankly, we believe that the losses suffered by the 
class members are generally so immense that in most cases it would be 
financially crippling to the corporation if the settlement compensated investors 
fully, or nearly so, for their losses. It is well understood that in most securities 
class actions, the defendant corporation whose misleading report caused 
investors to trade rarely, if ever, benefits at a level commensurate with the loss 
its misleading report has caused. 
For example, consider Issuer A whose managers materially inflate earnings 
in its annual report for two successive years (as well as in its interim financial 
reports). The managers carried out this scheme to enable them to reap the 
rewards of their stock options and bonuses, both being dependent on increasing 
the value of the company’s shares. When the lie is discovered, the stock 
declines twenty percent, and a class action is filed on behalf of 1500 investors 
who purchased Issuer A shares at prices inflated by the misleading reports. To 
simplify the example, assume these 1500 investors held their shares through 
settlement and collectively represent twenty-five percent of Issuer A’s 
outstanding shares. Assume further that the provable losses suffered by the 
class members are $1 billion (reflecting that the company’s market 
capitalization is $20 billion). It should be apparent that if Issuer A were to pay 
for the sins of its managers, the class members would indirectly absorb twenty-
five percent of such payment. Thus, with the consequent decline in the value of 
Issuer A due to such payment, it would appear that the class members would 
not be restored to the financial positions they had before purchasing Issuer A 
shares. 
Moreover, a settlement fully reflecting the class’s provable losses would be 
disproportionate to the gain garnered by the executives, unless these profits 
approached the settlement amount, which appears difficult to imagine. The real 
harm falls on the Issuer A stockholders, who bear a significant burden for the 
faults committed by the managers acting in their own interests, rather than the 
interests of the corporation. Finally, the settlement ignores the windfall that has 
 
83. See, e.g., White v. Auerbach, 500 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that only 
if the intervenor improves the settlement can her attorney be compensated from the resulting 
fund). See generally JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX AND HAZEN ON 
CORPORATIONS § 15.16 (2d ed. 2003). 
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been reaped by the former Issuer A stockholders who disposed of their shares 
to members of the class at a higher value ($1 billion) than they would have 
received had Issuer A’s financial reports been truthful. In this context, we 
might ask how compensation could ever be the sole objective of the securities 
laws. 
The complementary consideration to compensation is deterrence. 
Compensation and deterrence do not work at cross purposes; instead, they 
should be seen as supporting each other.84 If class actions are not fulfilling a 
compensatory function, then we need to pay more attention to whether they 
deter fraud. Issuer response to the deterrent effects of class actions could be 
detected by their adoption of internal procedures to prevent reporting 
violations. In this regard, we believe that the focus in these cases must shift 
from trying to conscript a company’s resources to compensate class members 
to instead imposing a sanction of sufficient size and content to deter others 
from failing to monitor their reporting mechanisms, which in turn deters 
fraudulent reporting. Such a sanction can be, as it is now, a small percentage of 
the losses suffered by the class. And, of course, a greater emphasis should 
instead be placed upon pursuing the actual wrongdoers, typically the officers.85 
Traditionally, these individuals have escaped liability in securities fraud class 
actions, as plaintiffs’ attorneys have agreed to settlements without insisting on 
the officers being held accountable. Deterrence would be more effective if 
companies knew it was in their best interests not to protect the real culprits. 
What would it take to increase the deterrent effect of securities fraud class 
actions against individual officers? At a minimum, the officers should be liable 
for the amount of any benefit that they obtained from the fraud, times some 
multiplier of those damages, to reflect the likelihood that their fraud would 
escape detection and the amount of the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees for bringing 
the action.86 To further the disciplinary impact of imposing liability upon the 
responsible officers, their employers should be prohibited from providing them 
insurance or indemnification for these damages.87 
 
84. For a discussion of not only the complementary nature of the compensation and 
deterrent undercurrents, but also how the courts nevertheless unwisely mold doctrines to 
favor the former when there is a conflict between these twin objectives, see James D. Cox, 
Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1985). 
85. See James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3 
(1999) (noting that greater emphasis needs to be placed on deterring officer wrongdoing). 
86. Employers could impose these penalties in employment contracts by inserting 
appropriate language into the definition of what constitutes termination for cause and then 
requiring the officer to reimburse the company for any penalties assessed for securities fraud 
violations. 
87. Thus, in Waltuch v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 1996), 
an officer who knowingly violated the Commodity Futures Trading Act could not recover on 
a provision of his employment contract that provided for indemnification of any claims 
arising from his employment. But, such indemnification is permitted where the conduct does 
not otherwise offend public policy. See, e.g., VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 85 
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Two other important issues would need to be satisfactorily resolved in such 
a system: first, how to incentivize the plaintiffs’ bar to bring such actions and, 
second, how to minimize the number of frivolous suits that are filed. These two 
issues are intimately intertwined. Entrepreneurial attorneys are more likely to 
bring too many suits, including strike suits, if there are high potential financial 
payoffs and low barriers to filing; on the other hand, higher barriers and lower 
payoffs are likely to cut down on the number of cases, including meritorious 
ones. 
The knowledgeable reader has by now recognized that these same issues 
concerning the private enforcement of the federal securities laws have arisen 
recurrently.88 Unfortunately, moving toward a deterrence-oriented regime will 
not eliminate such issues. At present, there is simply no way to calculate 
accurately the costs and benefits of raising or lowering barriers to filing fraud 
cases, or for that matter increasing or decreasing the returns to attorneys for 
filing them. What we can say on the basis of the data gathered in this study is 
that certain moderate reform steps can be taken which we believe will raise the 
consciousness among fund claimants of not just whether they have a claim but 
whether their interests are best served by the proposed settlement. Until we 
have these improvements, it is not possible to assess what is likely to be the 
effect on the conduct of class actions when many fewer institutions are asleep 
through the settlement process. 
B. Filing Claims Does Matter 
Our second concluding point is a response to a short article by Professor 
Adam Pritchard that commented on our earlier paper. Professor Pritchard asked 
whether we should care that not all institutions file claims; he concluded that 
we should not.89 His main point was that even a few billion dollars is small 
change to institutional investors because they manage trillions of dollars for 
investors. We believe that to so conclude misses the point. 
We think it does matter that many institutional investors do not file claims. 
For one thing, under current law, pension fund trustees are held to a standard of 
maximizing the value of their assets under management for others. If this 
concept is to have any real content, we cannot start adding qualifiers like the 
 
(Del. 1998) (permitting mandatory indemnification for an officer who was held liable for 
actions committed on a subsidiary corporation’s board). 
88. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711-15 (1996) (discussing the tradeoffs 
between screening out good suits and letting in bad ones inherent in PSLRA’s restrictions on 
filing securities fraud cases); Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act? (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Paper No. 03-04, 2005), http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=558285 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (analyzing the 
impact of PSLRA on the filing of meritorious cases). 
89. Adam C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883 (2002). 
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duty of care applies “only if really big money is involved.”90 Fiduciaries do, 
and should be required to, take all cost-justified measures to increase the value 
of beneficiary assets. 
Moreover, we think it is important that institutional investors are involved 
in the settlement process and, more generally, in securities fraud class actions. 
If the system needs reform, as both we and Professor Pritchard agree it does, 
the more institutional investors are active participants, the more pressure will 
be placed on the system to improve. The claims filing process needs to be 
fixed, and the institutions are in the best position to push for needed changes. If 
the current system and its related practices continue, we will continue to 
document apathy among institutional claimants and lose some of the impetus 
for making the provisions of the PSLRA work to the benefit of all investors. 
CONCLUSION 
To summarize our results, we find some significant problems in the current 
claims filing system. Using a much larger sample of settlements than in our 
earlier paper, we determine that a large majority of institutional investors failed 
to file claims in securities fraud class action settlements during the 1990s. 
Although our follow-up surveys indicate that the respondent institutions believe 
that they are adequately responding to this problem—and we see some positive 
developments in the marketplace with the formation of several third-party 
independent monitoring services—we think that there is still room for 
improvements in the process. 
We recommend that the courts mandate the creation of a centralized 
information website about securities fraud class action settlements and that they 
standardize claims forms and informational requirements for perfecting a claim. 
We think that institutions can do a better job of monitoring claims filing, 
especially after the creation of a centralized information source. Finally, we call 
on the SEC to strengthen its requirements for Form 13F filing and 
dissemination to make this information more transparent and accessible.  
 
90. If this logic did apply, then presumably fiduciaries would no longer need to devote 
time and resources to foreclosing on loan collateral when borrowers default, to filing claims 
in bankruptcy, or to recouping fee payments to fund managers when they are not made 
unless “big money” is involved. At the same time, it is important to remember that 
fiduciaries only have a duty to file cost-justified claims. 
